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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the growing cacophony of voices heralding or contesting the 
many facets of globalization, international organizations (“IOs”) are 
playing an increasingly prominent role.  Government officials, 
advocacy groups, and scholars are heatedly contesting the merits and 
demerits of using IOs to promote interstate cooperation and to resolve 
the many transborder collective action problems that globalization has 
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fostered.  These controversies raise important questions about how 
IOs are designed and how they respond to the uncertainties and 
changing circumstances that are endemic to international affairs. 
In the debates over globalization and institutional change, one 
IO—the International Labor Organization (“ILO”)—has been given 
surprisingly short shrift.1  Founded in 1919 and headquartered in 
Geneva, Switzerland, the ILO is one of the world’s oldest IOs.  It has 
survived a world war and a cold war, a major global depression and a 
slew of recessions, a quadrupling in the number of its member states, 
and the rise of global capitalism.2 
The ILO has a unique tripartite governance structure.  
Representatives of governments, organized labor, and employers from 
each of the organization’s 178 member states participate in the work 
of the ILO in a ratio of 2-1-1, respectively.  Worker and employer 
delegates attend the annual ILO Conference, the organization’s 
principal lawmaking body, and meetings of its executive arm, the 
Governing Body, in their independent capacities.  They form separate 
caucuses and often vote with their respective groups rather than with 
their governments.3  With only minor modifications, this “corporatist” 
tripartite structure has survived intact as the ILO’s membership has 
grown from a small club of Western European states to include 
members with radically different approaches to managing labor 
relations, including the United States, socialist nations, and a large 
contingent of countries from the developing world.4 
 
 1. In this Article, I use the Americanized spelling of the ILO’s name, but retain the 
original Anglicized spelling where it appears in official ILO documents and secondary sources. 
 2. See generally ANTONY ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 
(1971); DAVID A. MORSE, 1 THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
WORLD COMMUNITY (1969); THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (James T. 
Shotwell ed., 1934). 
 3. The ILO Constitution directs each member state to appoint two government delegates, 
one worker delegate, and one employer delegate. Constitution of the International Labour 
Organization art. 389.1, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 225 C.T.I.A. 373 [hereinafter 1919 ILO 
Constitution]. The constitution directs governments to appoint worker and employer delegates 
“in agreement with the industrial organizations . . . which are most representative of employers 
or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries.” Id. art. 389.3. For discussions of 
the ILO’s structure and the importance of tripartism to the organization’s work, see N. VALTICOS 
& G. VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 40–42 (1995); C. Wilfred Jenks, The 
Significance for International Law of the Tripartite Character of the International Labour 
Organisation, in 22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 45, 45–58 (1936); David Strang & 
Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: 
Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending 1960-80, 47 INT’L ORG. 235, 241 (1993). 
 4. Robert W. Cox, Labor and Hegemony, 31 INT’L ORG. 385, 386–88, 409–10 (1977) 
[hereinafter Cox, Labor and Hegemony]. See generally Lucio Baccaro, What Is Dead and What Is 
Alive in the Theory of Corporatism (Decent Work Research Programme Discussion Paper No. 
DP/143/2002, Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud., 2002) (describing the different meanings of corporatism), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp14302.pdf. 
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Given this tenacious capacity for survival and the central 
importance of labor rules to both economic development and trade, the 
ILO should occupy a pivotal, even preeminent, place in the debates 
over the role of IOs in globalization.  Remarkably, this is not the case.  
According to one recent study, “most reasonably informed people have 
little idea what the letters I-L-O stand for,” and even trade specialists 
and labor economists have failed to pay much attention to the 
organization and the lessons its survival may offer.5  This is a far cry 
from the widespread attention given to other IOs—such as the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the World Bank—which stand at the 
center of globalization’s maelstrom and which have prompted both 
street protests and reams of academic commentary. 
A principal reason for the ILO’s inconspicuous profile is a 
widely held perception that the organization is powerless to combat 
the workplace abuses that globalization can engender, abuses that 
include “child labor, punishingly long work days, harsh discipline, 
hazardous working conditions, sexual predation, and suppression of 
the freedom to associate and organize.”6  Numerous studies deride the 
ILO as a “90-pound weakling of UN agencies,” a “toothless tiger,”7 
whose only tools of influence are the sunshine of public scrutiny and 
the shame of public censure,8 and whose feeble enforcement 
mechanisms render all but nugatory its efforts to improve global labor 
conditions.9 
 
 5. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE 
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 93 (2003). 
 6. Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous 
Improvement in the Global Workplace, at 4 (May 2, 2000), available at http://www.archonfung. 
net/papers/RLS21.pdf. 
 7. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 95, 102. 
 8. See Edward Weisband, Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and 
Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 643, 648 (2000); see 
also Michael J. Trebilcock & Rob Howse, Trade Policy and Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 261, 274 (2005) (“[C]ompliance with ILO norms depends on a combination of public 
identification, embarrassment and shaming (a mild stick), and technical assistance to promote 
compliance (a mild carrot).”). 
 9. See, e.g., Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New 
International Political Economy, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 365, 399 (1999) (stating that the 
ILO is “[v]iewed by many as a ‘slow, cumbersome and low-profile institution’ . . . [that] has not 
made the impact it should in the new political economy”) (internal citation omitted); William A. 
Douglas et al., An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, 
US Trade Laws, Unions, and NGOs, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 273, 276 (2004) (noting “frequent 
allegations that the ILO ‘has no teeth,’ and that its work consequently makes little difference in 
the labor practices of governments”) (citation omitted); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 274 
(“The ILO has been widely criticized by proponents of a trade/labor linkage for ineffective 
enforcement of its norms . . . .”). 
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These critiques of the ILO’s efficacy cannot be attributed to 
institutional inertia.  Over the course of its long history, the ILO has 
adopted no fewer than 185 conventions and a similar number of 
recommendations.  These instruments range from basic human rights 
charters to detailed regulatory codes for specific industries.  Unlike 
domestic lawmaking bodies, whose rules apply automatically once 
adopted, the legislative output of the ILO—like that of all other IOs—
is subject to an additional political filter.  Each member state must 
separately ratify each convention adopted by the ILO before that 
treaty can legally bind that state. 
This political filter has led the ILO to adopt many treaties that 
are sparsely ratified.  The gap between treaty adoption and treaty 
ratification has increased over time.  In fact, with the exception of a 
few “core labor standards” agreements, ratification rates have actually 
declined.10  Recent econometric studies challenge the ILO’s efficacy at 
a deeper level.  They contest the organization’s claim that ratified 
treaties influence domestic labor practices, arguing instead that 
countries only sign on to conventions whose obligations are already 
reflected in their national laws.11 
The ILO was not always held in such low esteem.  The 
organization received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969 for its “lasting 
influence on the legislation of all countries.”12  Within the academy, 
the ILO was an object of attention and lavish praise by international 
legal scholars and political scientists alike.  Commentators penned 
detailed and laudatory analyses of the ILO’s treaty-making and 
treaty-monitoring functions, the influence of ILO officials, its 
tripartite structure, and its capacity to adapt to changes in its 
political, economic, and legal environment.13 
 
 10. See Int’l Lab. Office, Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards, 
Possible Improvements in the Standard-Setting Activities of the ILO: Addendum: Statistics on the 
Ratification of Conventions, GB.277/LILS/2(Add.1), 277th Sess. (Geneva Mar. 2000), available at  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb277/pdf/lils-2a1.pdf [hereinafter ILO, 
Statistics on Ratification]; Bernhard Boockmann, The Ratification of ILO Conventions: A Hazard 
Rate Analysis, 13 ECON. & POL. 281, 294 (2001). 
 11. See Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage, in 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 15, 20, 29 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 
2003). 
 12. Steve Charnovitz, Promoting Higher Labor Standards, 18 WASH. Q., Summer 1995, at 
167, 173 (1995). 
 13. For the most influential political science accounts, see Special Issue, The International 
Labor Organization, 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1933) [hereinafter ANNALS ILO 
ISSUE]; Robert W. Cox, ILO: Limited Monarchy, in THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION 
MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 102 (Robert W. Cox & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1974) 
[hereinafter Cox, Limited Monarchy]; ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: 
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); E. A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966) [hereinafter LANDY, 
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How, then, did the ILO fall so far from grace?  In part, because 
of the unintended consequences of decisions made by the individuals 
running the organization, in particular its Directors General and its 
permanent Secretariat—known as the ILO Office.14  Shortly after the 
organization’s founding at the end of the First World War, the first 
Director General, Albert Thomas, skillfully exploited ambiguities in 
the ILO Constitution and forged connections to national trade unions 
to increase the power and influence of ILO officials.  The Director 
General expanded the Office’s information gathering, standard 
setting, and treaty monitoring functions, enhancing its authority and 
effectiveness.  These innovations enabled the ILO to survive the 
Second World War and to forge a relationship with the newly created 
United Nations. 
The ILO’s evolution during the post-war period was very 
different, however.  Seeking to place the organization at the forefront 
of social and economic regulation, the ILO expanded its mandate to 
encompass new subject areas and modified preexisting lawmaking and 
monitoring procedures to match these new tasks.  These adaptations 
responded to both external pressures (including changes in the 
economic and political landscape and demands from a larger and more 
diverse membership) and internal initiatives (from the Directors 
General and ILO officials) to push the organization in new 
directions.15  For reasons I explain in greater detail below, these 
adaptive efforts were mostly unsuccessful, leading to a period of 
institutional stagnation during which the ILO became increasingly 
dysfunctional and ineffective. 
Over the last decade, however, the ILO has entered a new 
phase of innovation, one that has involved narrowing its mandate to 
emphasize universal compliance with a core group of fundamental 
labor rights.  This restructuring began with a period of self-critical 
analysis in which the organization, again led by the Director General 
and the Office, sought to learn from other IOs and from its own past 
mistakes.  The ILO has since adopted novel approaches to treaty-
making and treaty monitoring that are intended to streamline its 
activities, enhance its effectiveness, and reach out to new 
 
THIRTY YEARS]. For influential accounts by international legal scholars, some of them former 
ILO officials, see ALCOCK, supra note 2; C. WILFRED JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF 
NATIONS: THE ILO IMPACT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (1970) [hereinafter JENKS, ILO IMPACT]; MORSE, 
supra note 2. 
 14. The International Labor Office is the ILO’s permanent secretariat.  The Office is headed 
by the Director General, who is appointed by the Governing Body, the ILO’s executive arm.  See 
VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 42. 
 15. For a discussion of the distinction between exogenous and endogenous sources of change 
within IOs, see infra note 43. 
  
2006] GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO 655 
constituencies beyond the organized labor groups that have 
traditionally been its supporters. 
In this Article, I trace the ILO’s past and its present with two 
broad objectives in mind.  First, I offer a corrective to the prevailing 
view among international lawyers and legal scholars that the ILO is a 
weak and ineffective institution, one that has “been around forever, 
but . . . also has done nothing forever, so . . . is not terribly 
interesting.”16  Even a cursory review of the organization’s activities 
reveals the fallacy of this statement.  The ILO has not, however, been 
equally active or equally effective in influencing state behavior 
throughout its history.  A study of law-related innovation in the ILO 
thus offers important insights for legal scholars and government 
officials who seek to enhance the efficacy of other IOs. 
Second, this Article’s process-tracing history of the ILO serves 
an important theoretical purpose—to analyze the under-studied issue 
of how IOs change.  As world events have revealed the central role 
that IOs play in promoting interstate cooperation, scholars of 
international affairs have developed competing theories to explain 
why states create IOs and why IOs appear in different forms.17  But 
how IOs evolve after their founding is an under-theorized issue that 
commentators are only now beginning to consider.18  This omission is 
all the more consequential given disparities in IO longevity.  As a 
recent empirical study concludes, IOs “do have a mortality rate, and it 
can be surprisingly high.”19  But the evidence also reveals a strong 
survivor bias: the more years that have elapsed since an IO was 
founded, the longer it is likely to exist.20  This makes the ILO—at 
nearly ninety, one of the world’s oldest IOs—a particularly fruitful 
venue in which to analyze theories of institutional change. 
 
 16. The Challenge of Non-State Actors, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 20, 35 (1998) (reprinting 
the statement of Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace). 
 17. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 17–45 
(2005); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–10 (2005); 
THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Koremenos et al. eds., 2004); HENRY G. 
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN 
DIVERSITY (4th ed. 2004); Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and 
Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 
2002). For earlier influential contributions, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States 
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 8 (1998); Stephan 
Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491 (1987). 
 18. For a discussion of the few commentators that have addressed these issues, see infra 
Part II. 
 19. Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International 
Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996). 
 20. Id. at 621–22. 
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Three social science theories attempt to explain the mechanics 
of change in IOs: (1) rational choice; (2) neofunctionalism; and (3) 
historical institutionalism.21  Each theory offers a different prediction 
as to the actors that establish IOs, the goals of those actors, and the 
mechanisms they adopt to achieve their goals.  More intriguingly, each 
theory predicts that IOs will follow a different evolutionary path 
whose trajectory is marked by changes in their external environments, 
by shifts in state preferences, by the independent efforts of private 
parties and IO officials, or by a combination of these factors. 
A historical study of the ILO provides two opportunities to 
evaluate these competing theoretical frameworks and, in addition, to 
consider the under-examined role of IO officials in promoting 
institutional change.  First, the four major phases of the ILO’s 
existence—its founding, the interwar years, the decades following 
World War II, and post-Cold War globalization—offer discrete 
domains within which to assess the theories’ comparative explanatory 
power.  As I discuss below, no single theory explains the changes that 
occurred in each episode of the ILO’s life cycle.22  The influence of the 
ILO’s past on the organization’s current reforms provides a second 
opportunity for theoretical assessment.  As this Article will show, none 
of the theories would have expected ILO officials to revitalize the 
organization, seventy-five years after its birth, by contracting its 
authority rather than expanding it. 
Before proceeding with these arguments, a cautionary note is 
in order.  This Article does not seek to analyze every aspect of the 
ILO.23  Rather, I limit my focus to the creation of international labor 
standards and how the organization determines whether member 
states are adhering to those standards.  I refer to these two activities 
as, respectively, ILO “lawmaking” and ILO “monitoring.”24  
Lawmaking and monitoring are among the most important tasks that 
 
 21. See infra Part II (analyzing these theories and their variants in greater depth). 
 22. Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein & Nobuo Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case 
of Analytical Eclecticism, 26 INT’L SECURITY 153, 154 (2001) (arguing “against the privileging of 
parsimony that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates” and in favor of “drawing 
selectively on different [theoretical] paradigms”). 
 23. ILO activities not analyzed in this Article include technical assistance, educational 
activities, and the gathering and dissemination of cross-national labor statistics. See Strang & 
Chang, supra note 3, at 241. 
 24. “Lawmaking” includes the procedures by which an IO creates and revises legally 
binding treaty commitments and nonbinding recommendations. “Monitoring” focuses on 
implementation and compliance. It includes procedures for determining whether an IO’s member 
nations are adhering to the organization’s rules and norms and how the IO responds to the 
compliance information that it discovers. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 22–23, 26–27. 
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an IO performs.25  I analyze how the ILO’s founders envisioned that 
these activities would occur, and then consider how the two tasks 
evolved in response to changes in the organization’s external 
environment, to the varying composition and shifting demands of 
governments, workers, and employers, and, perhaps most 
surprisingly, to the independent efforts of the ILO Directors General 
and the ILO Office. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part II 
reviews three social science theories of IOs and analyzes the 
important but understudied issue of IO change.  Part III begins by 
developing a rational choice framework for international labor 
standards and evaluating the degree to which that framework is 
embodied in the ILO Constitution.  Part III then reviews the history of 
the ILO, dividing the analysis into discrete time periods that conform 
to distinct phases of the organization’s evolution.  Part IV analyzes the 
lawmaking and monitoring innovations that the ILO has adopted over 
the past decade, demonstrating the ways in which the organization 
has learned from other IOs and from its own past mistakes.  Part V 
concludes with a review of the ILO’s legal innovations and a 
counterfactual analysis of the three theories of IO change in light of 
the evidence presented. 
II. THEORIES OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Nation states frequently turn to IOs to address the myriad 
collective action problems that transcend national borders.26  For more 
than two decades, political scientists have sought to understand why 
states create IOs and why they select particular design features from 
the rich matrix of available alternatives.27  Scholars have advanced 
three major theories to answer these questions: (1) rational choice; (2) 
 
 25. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 273–584 (reviewing multilateral treaty-
making and dispute settlement by IOs). This assumes, of course, that the IO founders have 
delegated lawmaking and monitoring responsibilities to the organization. Not all IOs possess 
such delegated powers. 
 26. See Charlotte Ku, Global Governance and the Changing Face of International Law, 2 
ACUNS REP. & PAPERS 5, 24 (2001) (“A census of international institutions tells us that at the 
end of the 20th century there are more than 250 conventional international governmental 
organizations . . . [,] more than 1500 other international bodies[,] and roughly 3700 other 
institutions of special types, making a total of almost 5500.”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 4–17 (reviewing different definitions of IOs). 
 27. Serious study of cooperation via IOs and international regimes is generally traced to the 
publication of works by Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner.  See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 
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neofunctionalism; and (3) historical institutionalism.28  These three 
theories are partly grounded in different strands of international 
relations scholarship.29  But they are also central to theoretical 
approaches in social science (including sociological, resource 
dependence, and organization theories) that analyze the workings of 
domestic institutions or that study why similarly situated countries 
choose different institutions to address analogous problems.30 
These social science theories of institutions have made 
significant progress in explaining why nation states turn to IOs to 
help them establish and maintain cooperative relationships.  As 
Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman have recently written: “We know a 
lot about the conditions under which states establish IOs, why states 
will design them the way they do, and some of the conditions under 
which states will grant autonomy to IOs.”31  But for most scholars, the 
story of IOs ends where it ought to begin—with their founding.  What 
these institutions do once they have been created remains under-
examined and under-theorized. 
This omission is a significant and consequential gap in our 
understanding of international institutions.  Most IOs possess at least 
a modicum of autonomy; many are given substantial independence as 
a deliberate strategy to hold states fast to their cooperative 
commitments or to confer greater legitimacy upon the subsequent 
actions states take through them.  Yet this autonomy, whether great 
or small, creates opportunities for IOs (or, to be more precise, for the 
 
 28. I include within historical institutionalism a family of related theories that includes 
sociological institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism and organization theory. (A 
fourth variant, rational choice institutionalism, is more easily subsumed under a discussion of 
rational choice theory.) These variants of historical institutionalism share a basic premise—that 
political action is shaped and constrained by historically constructed institutions that exhibit 
surprising durability notwithstanding changes in their economic or political environment or 
shifts in the preferences of actors. For a more detailed discussion of the different variants of 
historical institutionalism, see Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the 
Three Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996). 
 29. For an analysis of the intersection between constructivism, rational choice, and 
historical institutionalism, see Thomas Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: 
Toward Conversations Across Paradigms, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 
597, 604–07 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) [hereinafter STATE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE].  
 30. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney 
& Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT, 
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1983); J.T. Hage, Organizational 
Innovation and Organizational Change, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 597 (1999); Paul Pierson & Theda 
Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, in STATE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE, supra note 29, at 693. 
 31. Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in 
International Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 593–94 (2005). 
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autonomous actors operating within them) to develop preferences and 
goals that diverge from those of their founders.  As IO autonomy 
increases, so too do opportunities to change an IO’s structures, 
mandates, and norms. 
If little is known about how IOs behave after they have been 
created, the causes of change in IOs are even less well understood.  
The issues to be addressed include such foundational questions as 
who or what catalyzes such formal or informal change of/in IOs and how is a consensus 
on the direction of change attained (if at all)?  Is this fundamentally driven by principals 
in a response to changes in rational interests or shifting domestic/global norms?  Or do 
IOs, as bureaucratic actors, strategically initiate specific reforms in anticipation of 
challenges in their external environments? . . .  [W]hat enables or constrains principals 
and/or IOs themselves from changing the formal and/or informal rules that drive 
organizational actions?32 
These questions reveal the wide expanse of theoretical and 
empirical terrain yet to be traversed.  However, by looking beyond the 
specific topic of IOs to social science literature on institutional change 
more generally, it is possible to identify hypotheses about IO change 
that build upon the foundations of different theoretical traditions. 
In the next sections, I undertake this analysis for rational 
choice, neofunctionalism, and historical institutionalism.  I identify 
the actors who found IOs, the goals of those actors, the mechanisms 
used to achieve those goals, the nature of change each theory predicts 
after an IO’s founding, the responses to those changes, and the 
expected outcomes.  A table at the end of these sections summarizes 
the key points of this analysis and the strengths and weaknesses of 
each theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32. Michael Tierney & Catherine Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for 
Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations 12–13 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citations omitted); see also Barnett & 
Coleman, supra note 31, at 594 (“[W]e know relatively little about how, why, and when change 
will occur.”). 
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A. Rational Choice and Exogenous Institutional Change 
Rational choice provides a compelling explanation of why IOs 
exist and why they appear in particular forms.  For rational choice 
scholars, IOs are creatures of nation states.  States call IOs into being; 
states select their design features; states control their funding and 
other forms of support; and states revise their mandates or even 
abolish them when national interests change.33 
Self-interested, strategic behavior provides rational choice’s 
driving force.  States establish IOs to overcome the limitations of their 
anarchic environment and to create joint gains that they could not 
achieve acting on their own.34  These gains include increasing the 
quality and quantity of information, reducing the costs of negotiating 
agreements and of linking discrete issue areas, resolving disputes over 
the meaning of rules and norms, monitoring behavior, and imposing 
sanctions for noncompliance.35 
Different strands of rational choice theory offer different 
answers to how, if at all, institutions evolve in response to changes in 
state preferences.  The most straightforward (and the most simplistic) 
approach imputes preferences to states from the “strategic 
situations”36 or collective action problems that they face.  Rather than 
examining an IO’s history or the goals of its founders, scholars 
adopting this approach take an analytical shortcut.  They use the 
functions that an institution now performs (or rationally should 
perform) to infer current state preferences.37  This assumes that 
preferences are well-defined and that there is a close if not perfect 
match between preferences and institutional design features. 
This approach also predicts that states tightly control the 
autonomy they delegate to IOs.  When organizations veer from their 
prescribed mandates, states quickly respond with corrective action.38  
 
 33. See ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 25; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 17, at 4–5; see 
also Kenneth W. Abbott, “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control 
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 1 n.3 (1993) 
(“[R]ationalist theory often assumes that states act as unitary entities.”). 
 34. See KEOHANE, supra note 27, at 85–109 (developing a functional theory of international 
regimes). 
 35. Id. at 85–109; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 8. 
 36. See Abbott, supra note 33, at 1–2 n.4 (defining a “strategic situation” as “involving a 
relationship of interdependence among a relatively small number of actors. When states . . . are 
involved in a strategic interaction, each state’s actions affect the fortunes of others as well its 
own, and the best course of action depends on what others may do.”). 
 37. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 108 
(2004). 
 38. See Darren Hawkins et al., States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent 
Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 27–37 (Darren 
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Perhaps most importantly, this rationalist vision of IOs sees both 
state preferences and institutions as essentially static.  Because 
change is inconsistent with the theory’s premises, it is simply assumed 
away.39 
Not all rational choice theories adopt such a denatured, time-
insensitive analysis.  Some accounts anticipate changes in the 
distribution of power or resources among states or in the geostrategic 
context in which they interact.40  Others consider the behavior of 
government agencies and non-state actors.41  And still others pay 
attention to the messiness and complexity of institutional origins and 
to the costs of creating new institutions or modifying old ones.42  
Considering any of these factors opens up opportunities for analyzing 
how institutions change. 
The change that these more capacious rational choice 
approaches predict has very specific characteristics, however.  Most 
fundamentally, change is exogenous to the institution and occurs as a 
result of shifts in state preferences.43  Such preference shifts often 
 
Hawkins et al. eds., forthcoming 2006), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/Delegation 
%20volume.htm. 
 39. See Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN 
HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast 
eds., 2005). 
 40. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 359–60 (2002). 
 41. See Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The 
Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12–30 (2005). 
 42. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 5–8 (discussing rational choice variant of 
historical institutionalism). 
 43. Distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous sources of change in the study of 
institutions is a difficult and unsettled issue. See Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: 
Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, 6 J. THEORETICAL POL. 449, 456 (1994) (“The 
normal distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables is . . . awkward for institutional 
analysis.”); Avner Greif & David D. Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 633, 633 (2004) (“Endogenous institutional change appears . . . to be a 
contradiction in terms.”). This is particularly true for an intergovernmental organization such as 
the ILO, whose membership is composed not only of governments but also of autonomous groups 
of workers and employers. However, most scholars analyzing IO change appear to agree—albeit 
using different labels at times—that change emanating from IO officials and staff is properly 
labeled as “endogenous,” whereas that change resulting from shifts in state preferences or from 
alterations to the economic, political, or social environment is appropriately described as 
“exogenous.” See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 594 (“The dominant view is that external 
forces in general and states in particular are responsible for its timing, direction, and 
content. . . . Yet if IOs can take on a life of their own, then they can be agents of change.”); see 
also Tierney & Weaver, supra note 32, at 10 (“[S]cholars of IO are waking up to [the] reality . . . 
that IOs . . . exhibit varying degrees of autonomy and consequently possess their own preferences 
and bureaucratic cultures that are distinct from those of their member states.”). I adopt these 
definitions of exogenous and endogenous here, but recognize that alternative labels are possible 
and that a more extended treatment of these issues is warranted. See Simon Hug, Endogenous 
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follow large and sudden transformations in the external environment.  
These shocks, disasters, and crises upset settled habits, alter the 
calculus of sunk costs and anticipated benefits, and enable 
institutional reforms unobtainable in more settled times.44  In the 
comparative politics literature, rational choice scholars account for 
such discontinuous institutional changes by searching for “critical 
junctures”—key events that usher in distinctively new conditions.45  
The result is a model of “punctuated equilibrium,” in which scholars 
predict that only rare, sudden, and intense exogenous forces will 
herald path-altering institutional change.  Outside of these infrequent 
and precarious periods, however, institutions are stable or even 
static.46 
Consistent with its focus on state preferences, this more 
nuanced version of rational choice theory predicts specific types of 
responses by an IO’s membership.  If the cost of closing the gap 
between current preferences and preexisting IO structures is too high, 
states may abandon an old institution and establish another to 
supplant it.47  Or they may stick with an existing IO but consciously 
redesign it to fit the new environment.48  As IOs respond to these new 
institutional structures, a self-reinforcing equilibrium is achieved, 
leading to a fresh period of institutional quiescence in which state 
preferences are aligned with IO functions. 
The rational choice framework sketched above provides useful 
insights for analyzing the forms and functions of IOs and for 
predicting states’ responses to exogenous shocks.  However, its 
explanation of institutional change is incomplete in at least three 
important respects. 
 
Preferences and Delegation in the European Union, 36 COMP. POL. STUD. 41 (2003) (discussing 
preference divergences between European Union member states and the supranational actors 
they appoint to the European Commission). 
 44. See Devesh Kapur, Processes of Change in International Organizations 8 (Harvard U. 
Weatherhead Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-02, 2000), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ 
papers/164__Helsinki3.wcfia.pdf; Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of 
International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 766–67 (2001). 
 45. PIERSON, supra note 37, at 51. As I explain below, historical institutionalism also 
considers that critical junctures can be important precursors of institutional change.  See infra 
Part II.C. 
 46. Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES 1, 7. 
 47. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2005) (describing 
an instance in which states withdrew from a treaty establishing an IO and established a rival 
organization). 
 48. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 766–67 (arguing that “conscious design” is “the 
overriding mechanism guiding the development of international institutions” and institutional 
change). 
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First, rational choice fails to consider that the birth of IOs often 
involves political compromises among coalitions of founders with 
multiple and often conflicting objectives for establishing a new 
institution.49  Second, it gives insufficient attention to government 
officials and private parties, whose interests are often distinct from 
states or their leaders and who can use IOs to help further those 
interests, especially if they possess a formal voice in the organization.  
Third and most significantly, the theory fails to adequately consider 
the role of IO officials as independent strategic actors who have the 
autonomy (if not always the outright authority) to set agendas and 
select tasks that chart a course away from an institution’s original 
goals.50 
Each of these omissions underplays the possibility that change 
can occur endogenously, that is, that change can emanate from within 
an organization.51  The failure to account for internally-driven 
modifications to an organization’s structure, activities, or norms has 
recently been noted by rational choice scholars of domestic 
institutions.52  One response to this omission—one that is fully 
consistent with the theory’s rationalist premise—is to recognize IO 
independence as a conscious design feature of certain institutions.53  
More autonomy for IO officials and staff brings an increased likelihood 
that “IOs can potentially use that autonomy in ways that are not 
dictated or delegated by states.”54   
This approach resonates with recent principal-agent theories of 
IO behavior.55  But it allows only limited conceptual space for IO 
independence and for the endogenous changes that such autonomy 
can engender.  Rather than analyzing these issues, rational choice 
scholars emphasize why sovereign states delegate autonomy to IOs in 
 
 49. PIERSON, supra note 37, at 108–12. 
 50. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 22 (2004) (“IOs must be autonomous actors in some ways 
simply to fulfill their delegated tasks.”) (emphasis in original). 
 51. See supra note 43 (discussing the distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
sources of IO change). 
 52. Barry R. Weingast, Rational-Choice Institutionalism, in STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE, 
supra note 29, at 660, 692 (characterizing issues of “endogenous emergence, choice and survival 
of institutions” as “frontier issues” for rational choice scholars). 
 53. Tierney & Weaver, supra note 32, at 10. For a debate over the benefits of independence 
in international tribunals, compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in 
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005). 
 54. Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595. 
 55. See Hawkins et al., supra note 38. 
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the first instance and how they correct for “agency slack.”56  Such 
scholars pay far less attention to the subsequent activities of IOs and 
to how states interact with them.57 
B. Neofunctionalism and Endogenous Institutional Change 
There is, however, an older theoretical tradition—
neofunctionalism—that identifies endogenous actors as the main 
engine of IO change.  Neofunctionalism was first advanced by political 
scientists to explain the sharp increase in the number of global and 
regional IOs after the Second World War.  According to the theory’s 
adherents, IOs arise from the need to address technical and apolitical 
transborder issues, such as disease prevention, trade barriers, and 
finance.58  States assign IOs the autonomy needed to promote 
cooperation in these technocratic, functionally-defined issue areas. 
Neofunctionalism shares with rational choice the premise that 
actors are self-interested and utility-maximizing.  But its disassembly 
of states into their constituent parts allows neofunctionalists to model 
separately the interests of sub-state actors and IO officials and to 
identify how these two groups work in concert to expand the scope of 
international cooperation.59 
The process of change begins as domestic interest groups 
recognize that by working within IOs they can achieve results they 
could not obtain in national politics.  IO officials, in turn, realize the 
benefits of alliances with these groups and actively cultivate their 
support.  As demands from these sub-state actors increase, officials 
promote modest expansions of IO authority that are logical, functional 
add-ons to existing tasks and that serve both their own interests and 
those of their sub-state clients.60 
 
 56. See id. at 7. 
 57. See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595. But see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 
53, at 942–55 (analyzing both exogenous state controls and endogenous cultures of 
professionalism that together create a zone of “constrained independence” for international 
courts and tribunals). 
 58. Ernst Haas was the principal proponent of neofunctionalism for both global and 
regional organizations. See HAAS, supra note 13; ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: 
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950–57 (1958); Ernst Haas, International 
Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT’L ORG. 366 (1961). Haas’s theory of 
neofunctionalism was a modification of earlier, functionalist theories of international integration 
through IOs. See DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE 
FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1944). 
 59. See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 53–57 (1993). 
 60. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 47–50. 
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The institutional change that results from these interactions is 
the inverse of that predicted by rational choice models.  It is 
endogenous, incremental, and continuous, producing small effects at 
each individual step but cumulatively resulting in ever deeper levels 
of cooperation.61  As support from sub-state actors grows, cooperation 
takes on a self-reinforcing dynamic.  It spills over from technical, 
function issues with low political salience to high-politics issues such 
as peace and security, arms control, and human rights.62 
The challenge for IO officials is how to promote cooperation as 
activities shift into areas of greater political contestation.  For 
neofunctionalists, the prescription is not to avoid politics but to 
manage it.  Cooperation deepens when officials strategically identify 
and select tasks that enhance the organization’s authority and that 
garner additional support from domestic interest groups and other 
sub-state actors, while persuading states that such tasks further their 
interests as well.  Leadership and skill in agenda setting are, in this 
view, important precursors for successful IO expansions.63  The end 
result of these efforts, neofunctionalists predict, is slow but inexorable 
progress toward integration.64 
Although neofunctionalism is strong on issues of endogenous 
change where rational choice is weak, it suffers from its own serious 
deficiencies.  Its most striking failure was to predict that the 
expansion of international cooperation would eventually shift political 
loyalties from nation states to IOs.  Even in the world’s most 
integrated international polity—the European Community—no such 
transfer of loyalties has occurred, leading the theory’s proponents to 
renounce its more far-reaching claims.65  In addition to its overly 
 
 61. Neofunctionalists recognize that IOs change in response to changes in their 
environment, but these exogenous forces are not the focus of their analysis. See HAAS, supra note 
13, at 129–31. 
 62. See Tim Büthe & Gabriel T. Swank, The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in the 
European Union: Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to 2004 at 6–12 (Dec. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (summarizing history of neofunctionalism and 
reviewing writings of scholars who have endorsed it); David Zaring, International Law by Other 
Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 281, 313–16 (1998) (same). 
 63. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 119–25; R.W. Cox, Towards a General Theory of 
International Organization, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 99, 101 (1965) (reviewing ERNST B. 
HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964)) 
[hereinafter Cox, General Theory of IO]. 
 64. Zaring, supra note 62, at 314. 
 65. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, in 25 INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: RESEARCH SERIES (1975). Recently, however, scholars have begun to 
revisit the insights of neofunctionalist theory, in particular as it relates to legal issues. See, e.g., 
Gráinne de Búrca, Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory, 12 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 310 
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sanguine empirical predictions, neofunctionalism’s privileging of 
cooperation over conflict makes no allowance for dysfunctional 
organizational changes (such as expansions of autonomy that benefit 
IO bureaucrats but not domestic actors) or for “the plethora of 
outcomes . . . that fall between success and failure.”66 
C. Historical Institutionalism and Multiple Sources of Institutional 
Change 
If neofunctionalism overemphasizes the likelihood of IO 
cooperation, and rational choice overstates the ability of nation states 
to use institutions to serve rational ends, historical institutionalism 
offers a third approach to explain how IOs change over time.  Unlike 
rational actor models that are based on generic cooperation problems, 
historical institutionalism considers the particular historical and 
social contexts in which IOs are born and in which they must 
survive.67  It recognizes that institutions are established by multiple 
actors with divergent and often conflicting preferences.  Tensions 
within this founding coalition mean that no one group of actors 
predominates in specifying an institution’s structures and functions.68  
The result is an unavoidable gap between the founders’ goals and the 
design features they select to achieve them.69 
This gap between goals and institutional structures implies 
that even the most homogenous founding coalition will have difficulty 
dictating an IO’s functions as it matures.  At best, such a coalition can 
select design features to achieve functional goals in the short term.  As 
time horizons lengthen, however, the institution inevitably evolves in 
ways that its founders neither anticipated nor intended.  Initial design 
choices produce unintended consequences that shape and constrain 
the future behavior of actors whose identity and composition may have 
changed since the time of the organization’s founding.70 
Historical institutionalists anticipate that change will occur.  
But they do not prejudge its direction, pace, scope, or source.  Change 
 
(2005); Philippe C. Schmitter, Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism, 12 J. 
EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 255 (2005). 
 66. Michael G. Huelshoff, Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of 
Integration Theory, 38 INT’L STUD. Q. 255, 258 (1994). 
 67. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 4–5. 
 68. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 110 (arguing that multiple actors, multiple purposes, 
and multiple effects are more pronounced “in the construction of constitutions”). The 
constitutions of IOs manifest similar features. See infra Part III.B. 
 69. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 11, 19. 
 70. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 14–15; Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: 
A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, 29 COMP. POL. STUD. 123, 147 (1996). 
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can be either positive or negative, abrupt or slow.  Change can be path 
dependent, its direction marked out by the increasing returns and 
positive feedback that result from first-generation decisions.71  Or it 
can be more fluid and adaptive, evolving incrementally but producing 
“transformative results.”72  It can result in modifications to formal 
institutional structures or to informal practices and working 
methods.73  Perhaps most importantly, change can emanate from 
within the organization, from outside it, or from a mix of endogenous 
and exogenous sources. 
Of the three theories of change discussed in this Article, 
historical institutionalism is the most recent.  Most of the literature 
focuses on domestic political institutions and compares their 
geographic differences and temporal development.  Scholars analyzing 
these issues have created different typologies and frameworks to 
categorize change processes within domestic institutions.  These 
include Streek and Thelen’s five categories of gradual institutional 
transformation (displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and 
exhaustion);74 Pierson’s analysis of long-term processes of institutional 
change (such as positive feedback, path dependence, and 
sequencing);75 and Katznelson and Weingast’s effort to bridge 
historical institutionalism and rational choice theories.76 
Historical institutionalist treatments of IOs are less well 
developed, both theoretically and empirically.  The most extensive 
analysis has been done by Barnett and Finnemore, who work in the 
constructivist school of international relations theory.  Barnett and 
Finnemore view IOs as “active agents in their own change” with a 
“propensity toward dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior.”77  
They recognize both external and internal sources of change that 
emanate from conflicts over material resources or divergent 
interpretations of organizational culture.78  Although the causes of 
change are diverse, they all point to a common outcome: an expansion 
in the size of IOs and the functions they perform.79  Most recently, 
Barnett and Coleman have considered IOs as strategic actors that 
 
 71. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 20–30. 
 72. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 9 (emphasis omitted). 
 73. Id. at 19. 
 74. Id. at 18–31. 
 75. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 17–53. 
 76. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 7–21. 
 77. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 3, 158. 
 78. Id. at 42–43. 
 79. Id. at 43 (“IOs tend to define both problems and solutions in ways that favor or even 
require expanded action for IOs.”). 
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seek to “further their mandate, . . . protect their autonomy, and 
minimize organizational insecurity.”80  The authors develop a typology 
of strategies (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, 
manipulation, and strategic social construction) that IOs deploy in 
response to different levels of organizational security and different 
degrees of incongruity between internal organizational culture and the 
external environment.81 
As these diverse approaches illustrate, historical 
institutionalism considers multiple sources of change and the 
interactions among those sources to explain how institutions adapt, 
innovate, or stagnate over time.  This capaciousness is one of the 
paradigm’s strengths.  But it also presents one of its greatest 
challenges.  For example, historical institutionalism characterizes 
some IOs as entrenched and resistant to reform; others as proactive 
and seeking to take on new tasks.82  These contrasting 
characterizations are possible because of the theory’s emphasis on 
context-specific factors and historical contingencies.  But this focus 
also limits the theory’s predictive power, making it difficult to isolate 
the causal contribution of any single explanatory variable and limiting 
the policy prescriptions the theory offers for other organizations.83 
To address these concerns, empirical studies of IO evolution 
that emphasize historical particularities should also strive to identify 
common patterns upon which to build working hypotheses that then 
can be falsified or refined by other scholars.84  I take up this challenge 
in the concluding section of this Article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80. Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595. 
 81. Id. at 600–02. 
 82. See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 2. 
 83. See Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 6; see also Tierney & Weaver, supra note 
32, at 13 (emphasizing that the processes of how IOs change raise “extremely difficult 
questions”). 
 84. See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 164 (asserting, based on historical and 
empirical study of three IOs, that “IOs appear to be steadily expanding their mandates in a 
convergent direction: all are increasingly involved in the domestic affairs of states, and, 
specifically, all are trying to create durable, modern nation-states that are organized around 
democracy and markets”). 
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D. Summary 
The table below summarizes the mechanisms of institutional 
change predicted by each of the three theories reviewed above.  It 
identifies the principal actors who establish IOs, the goals of those 
actors, the design features they select to achieve their goals, the 
nature of the changes that each theory predicts will occur after the 
IO’s founding, how actors respond to those changes, and the expected 
outcomes.  The table also summarizes the strengths and weaknesses 
of each theory. 
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Table 1: Theories of Change in International Organizations 
 
 Rational choice NeoFunctionalism Historical 
Institutionalism 
IO Founders 
and their Basic 
Characteristics 
♦States (usually 
unitary actors) 
♦Rational, self-
interested and utility-
maximizing 
♦Government officials 
and private parties 
♦Self-interested and 
utility-maximizing 
♦Domestic actors seek 
to expand cooperation  
♦States, government 
officials, and private parties 
♦Actors’ interests and 
preferences shaped by 
historical and social contexts 
Goals of IO 
Founders 
♦General—Efficiency 
♦Specific—Joint gains 
from inter-state 
cooperation, e.g. 
reduced transaction 
costs, information, 
monitoring, etc. 
♦General—
Cooperation 
♦Specific—Mutually 
beneficial rules to 
manage 
technical/apolitical 
issues 
♦No predetermined 
substantive goals 
♦Coalitions of actors with 
multiple and often 
inconsistent goals 
Mechanisms 
Used to Achieve 
Goals at 
Founding of IO 
♦Rational selection of 
IO design features to 
solve a specific 
cooperation problem 
♦Goal clarity 
♦Assumption of perfect 
or close match between 
goals and selected 
design features 
♦Limited IO autonomy 
♦Functional selection 
of IO design features to 
promote cooperation in 
areas of “low politics” 
♦IO autonomy 
sufficient to achieve 
functional goals 
♦Tensions among goals and 
coalitions of IO founders 
♦Tensions create gaps 
between goals and chosen 
design features 
♦Rational or functional 
design unlikely or effective 
only in short term 
♦Variable IO autonomy 
Nature of 
Change 
Predicted After 
Founding of IO 
♦Change frequently 
ignored 
♦Any change that 
occurs results from 
shifts in state 
preferences 
♦Change viewed as: 
▪Exogenous 
▪Infrequent 
▪Sudden and 
discontinuous 
▪Producing large effects 
▪Producing punctuated 
equilibria 
♦Anticipates existence 
and  nature of change 
♦Formation of 
beneficial alliances 
between IOs and 
domestic interest 
groups 
♦Change viewed as: 
▪Endogenous 
▪Incremental 
▪Producing small 
effects 
▪Teleological  
♦Fact of change anticipated, 
but not its nature or 
direction 
♦IOs develop interests 
independent of states 
♦Change viewed as: 
▪Endogenous, exogenous, 
or both 
▪Path dependent 
▪Result of unanticipated 
consequences 
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 Rational choice NeoFunctionalism Historical 
Institutionalism 
Expected 
Outcomes 
♦IOs are (more or less) 
faithful agents and 
respond to controls by 
States principals 
♦Desired goals 
achieved and self-
reinforcing equilibrium 
established (or) 
♦States abandon IO 
and establish a rival 
institution 
♦Expansion of IO 
autonomy 
♦Cooperation expands 
from “low politics” to 
“high politics” issues 
♦Loyalties shift from 
States to IOs 
♦Eventual integration 
♦Outcomes highly variable: 
♦Expansion of IO functions 
and responsibilities 
♦Pathological and inefficient 
self-preservation of IOs 
♦Significant IO redesign 
possible 
Major 
Strengths and 
Weaknesses of 
Each 
Theoretical 
Framework  
Major Strengths: 
♦Simplicity and 
predictability 
♦Strategic analysis 
explains why states 
create IOs and the 
design features they 
select 
Major Weaknesses: 
♦Difficulty addressing 
multiple actors with 
competing goals 
♦Change under-
theorized and limited 
to exogenous sources 
Major Strengths: 
♦Models endogenous 
change 
♦Models expansion of 
IOs via incremental 
change 
Major Weaknesses: 
♦No explanation for 
failures of cooperation 
♦Shift of loyalties to 
IOs disproven 
empirically 
Major Strengths: 
♦Models interests of 
multiple state and non-state 
actors 
♦Includes multiple sources 
of change and both positive 
and negative outcomes 
Major Weaknesses: 
♦Relationship among 
sources of change difficult to 
specify 
♦Less predictive power 
 
III. DESIGN, EVOLUTION, INNOVATION, AND STAGNATION IN THE ILO 
Social science theories of institutional change provide a useful 
framework for studying the ILO’s long history of evolution, innovation, 
and stagnation.  The ILO has survived numerous external and 
internal changes since its creation at the end of the First World War.  
It would be impossible in the pages of a single book—let alone a single 
journal article—to portray the organization’s complex and rich history 
in detail. 
This Part therefore paints the ILO’s historical portrait with 
broader brushstrokes, focusing on two of the organization’s most 
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important functions—lawmaking and monitoring.85  I emphasize three 
goals that the ILO’s founders sought to achieve with respect to these 
functions: (1) universal membership in the organization and 
widespread ratification of the treaties it generated (“universality”); (2) 
international labor standards durable enough to improve domestic 
labor practices but flexible enough to apply to rapidly changing 
workplace conditions in countries at different stages of economic 
development (“flexibility”); and (3) centralized monitoring mechanisms 
to determine whether states were in fact adhering to the standards 
they had pledged to follow (“centralization”). 
I begin with rational choice.  I analyze the different collective 
action problems that international labor standards present and 
identify the institutional design choices that an abstract analysis of 
these problems implies.  I then show how these design choices are only 
partially and imperfectly embodied in the ILO Constitution,86 
reflecting the conflicting political and functional motivations of its 
drafters. 
After reviewing the ILO’s constitutional architecture from a 
rational choice perspective and situating the organization’s birth in a 
wider political and historical context, I examine the evolution of ILO 
lawmaking and monitoring during the organization’s first two decades 
of life.  The ILO’s development during this period closely tracks the 
endogenous changes predicted by neofunctionalist theory.  In 
particular, the first Director General and the ILO Office furthered the 
founders’ goals of universality, flexibility, and centralization by 
forging alliances with national labor unions in ways that also 
expanded the authority of ILO officials and staff. 
The historical narrative resumes toward the end of the Second 
World War.  I document the ILO’s second wave of expansion into new 
subject areas and trace this enlargement to changes in the economic 
and political environment and to disputes among the ILO’s 
increasingly large, diverse, and fractious membership.  These 
exogenous changes precipitated a broadening of the ILO’s mandate 
into politically contested areas.  When added onto the innovations 
adopted during the pre-war period, these post-war expansions 
generated perverse incentives to adopt treaties that were not widely 
ratified, that were normatively incoherent, and that were 
inadequately monitored.  Taken together, these problems—which 
 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 24 (defining ILO lawmaking and ILO monitoring). 
 86. The ILO Constitution appears as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. As explained 
below in Part III.D, the constitution was amended after World War II. See generally EBERE 
OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 
(1985) (providing a detailed analysis of the ILO Constitution and general practices of the ILO). 
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track the predictions of some historical institutionalist accounts of 
organizational change—hampered the ILO’s effectiveness and 
contributed to its current reputation as a weak and ineffectual IO. 
A. The Rational Design of International Labor Standards 
The protection of international labor standards raises four 
interrelated issues that together comprise the “strategic situation”87 
facing the ILO: (1) the number of nation states to be governed by those 
standards; (2) the type of collective action problem that the standards 
attempt to resolve; (3) the uncertainties of regulating workplace 
conditions in different countries and in response to changing 
industrial practices and improvements in technology; and (4) the 
ability of states to deviate from prior commitments as a result of 
international law’s weak enforcement mechanisms.88  As I explain 
below, the ILO’s founders responded to this strategic situation by 
designing an institution with aspirations to (1) universal membership 
and widespread treaty ratifications; (2) appropriately flexible 
substantive rules; and (3) centralized mechanisms for monitoring 
state behavior.89 
1. Universality 
A rationally designed IO includes all actors that can influence 
cooperation in a particular issue area.90  For an IO charged with 
creating and monitoring international labor standards, universality is 
the optimal membership rule.  The ILO’s founders recognized this 
point expressly, stating in the preamble to the ILO Constitution that 
“the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an 
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries.”91  This statement succinctly 
 
 87. See Abbott, supra note 33, at 1 n.4 (defining a strategic situation). 
 88. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 773 (listing enforcement, number, and 
uncertainty, inter alia, as independent variables that states face when seeking resolve collective 
action problems). 
 89. See id. at 769 (listing membership, flexibility, and centralization, inter alia, as 
dependent variables that states manipulate when designing IOs to particular strategic 
situations). 
 90. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 195–220 (2003) (analyzing the importance of membership 
rules in promoting international cooperation); George W. Downs et al, Managing the Evolution of 
Multilateralism, 52 INT’L ORG. 397, 398 (1998) (same). 
 91. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also INT’L LAB. 
OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: THE FIRST DECADE 35 (1931) [hereinafter ILO, 
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captures the proverbial race-to-the-bottom, a race in which each 
country lowers its labor standards in a bid to attract foreign 
investment or to give its domestic industries competitive advantages 
over foreign exporters.  The result is a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma.  All 
states reduce their labor standards to suboptimal levels but, in the 
end, retain their preexisting share of trade or investment after the 
race has run its course.92 
The ILO attempts to prevent this race to the bottom by 
establishing a common baseline of global labor standards that deters 
states from entering the race in the first instance.93  If, however, even 
one nation remains outside of the organization and the legal 
standards it promulgates, it can avoid that common baseline and 
exploit its competitive position to the detriment of member nations.  
The size of the negative externalities generated by outsider states 
depends upon their level of economic development, the size of their 
labor markets, and their share of world trade.  But the risk of free 
riding is present so long as any state remains outside of the 
organization or fails to ratify the treaties that articulate global ground 
rules for protecting workers and regulating workplace conditions. 
The content and function of those global rules, however, 
depends upon the type of collective action problem the organization’s 
members confront.  The ILO’s founders feared a race to the bottom 
because they believed that regulating labor and workplace conditions 
made nations less competitive, raising the cost of exports and 
deterring foreign investment.94  At the same time, and somewhat 
paradoxically, they also viewed “the well-being, physical, moral and 
intellectual, of industrial wage-earners” as having an intrinsic value 
akin to fundamental human rights.95  This alternative vision suggests 
 
THE FIRST DECADE] (stating that “the universality at which the [ILO] must logically aim is three 
times emphasised in the Preamble”). 
 92. See Brian A. Langille, Re-Reading the Preamble to the 1919 ILO Constitution in Light of 
Recent Data on FDI and Worker Rights, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 87, 91 (2003) [hereinafter 
Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble]; Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 270–71. 
 93. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405 (describing procedures for adoption of 
international labor standards). 
 94. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 273–74 (noting difficulties in getting 
rival states to ratify ILO conventions); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 261–62 (“Many of 
these early efforts were motivated by the concern that in the absence of international labor 
standards, international competition in an environment of increasingly freer trade would 
precipitate a race to the bottom.”). But see infra note 110 (citing recent empirical studies 
indicating that compliance with core labor standards neither increases the cost of exports nor 
deters foreign investment, undermining the race-to-the-bottom rationale for international labor 
standards). 
 95. See 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 427; ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 
91, at 28 (stating that the “social justice” element of international labor standards has “moral 
value” and is “an end in itself”); Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 98 
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that there is in fact no race to enter because nations share a 
humanitarian commitment to protect a core group of global labor 
rights.  As I explain below, these competing conceptions of 
international labor standards have persisted throughout the ILO’s 
history, serving as an important tool for changing the structure and 
substantive focus of ILO lawmaking and ILO monitoring. 
2. Flexibility 
A second concern of an IO’s founders is how to adjust the 
organization’s rules to reflect the pervasive uncertainties of 
international affairs.  Because states cooperate under conditions of 
incomplete information, they cannot fully predict the behavior and 
preferences of other nations, the future application of international 
rules, or the state of the world and how it may change over time.96  
The founders can mitigate these unknowns by increasing the 
flexibility of institutional structures and the treaties and 
recommendations that the organization adopts. 
Flexibility has numerous advantages.  It allows IOs with 
universal membership to adjust rules to account for material 
differences among member states, it facilitates the revision of rules if 
predictions about the future turn out to be inaccurate, and it prevents 
IOs and treaties from becoming moribund.  Flexibility provisions that 
are too generous, however, can reduce the credibility of member states’ 
commitment to cooperate or do little to change preexisting behaviors.  
As a result, “one of the greatest challenges in institutional design is to 
find the optimal trade-off between stickiness and flexibility.”97 
In the ILO, flexibility concerns cluster around three issues.  
The first is whether international labor standards should be protected 
in legally binding conventions or nonbinding recommendations.  The 
ILO’s founders provided for both approaches, recognizing the 
advantages of both hard and soft law for regulating workplace 
 
(describing a more empirically accurate view of international labor standards “as part of the 
package of interactive economic, social, and political freedoms, which are both the destination 
and the way to successful economies and societies”). Commentators disagree, however, over 
precisely which labor standards rise to the level of human rights. See Trebilcock & Howse, supra 
note 8, at 273. 
 96. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 778–79 (analyzing the independent variable of 
uncertainty); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade 
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829, 832–35 (2001) (discussing escape 
clauses and political uncertainty). 
 97. Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 1051, 1076 (2001). 
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conditions.98  A second flexibility issue concerns how to tailor labor 
standards to states at different levels of economic development.  The 
states that founded the ILO understood the value of accommodating 
national differences, particularly for countries with less advanced 
economies and labor markets.99  The third dimension of ILO flexibility 
is temporal rather than geographic.  Labor markets and workplace 
conditions can shift rapidly in response to economic, industrial, or 
technological changes, rendering existing labor standards outdated or 
obsolete.  The ILO’s founders were aware of these exogenous changes, 
and ILO officials developed detailed lawmaking procedures to revise 
and update international labor standards in response to them.100 
This trio of issues reveals that calibrating the optimal tradeoff 
between durability and flexibility was a pervasive challenge for the 
states that supported the ILO’s creation. 
3. Centralization 
Third and finally, the designers of an IO must consider 
whether to create centralized monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to disseminate information, reduce bargaining and 
transaction costs, and review state behavior.101  International law 
lacks the built-in enforcement tools found in national legal systems.  
As a result, states may deviate from their prior commitments if doing 
so generates larger individual gains than those offered by cooperation.  
To address this pervasive risk of noncompliance, rational choice 
theorists argue either that treaties must be compatible with state 
incentives such that adhering to them serves state interests, or that 
IOs must include strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to 
deter states from cheating.102 
 
 98. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405, ¶ 1 (authorizing the ILO to adopt both 
conventions and recommendations). 
 99. Id. art. 405, ¶ 3 (directing ILO members to consider modifying treaties and 
recommendations to accommodate countries with different climatic conditions, less advanced 
economies or labor markets, and other special circumstances); id. art. 427 (noting the difficulty of 
obtaining “strict uniformity in the conditions of labour”). 
 100. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 33 (describing views of founders 
emphasizing “the impossibility of drafting immediately a code which could apply permanently 
over a long period and of foreseeing all the future developments . . . which might be aimed at 
later”). However, as explained below, infra Part III.C.1, the Constitution itself did not expressly 
address the ILO’s power to revise conventions. See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Revision of 
International Labour Conventions, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 43, 48 (1933) [hereinafter Jenks, 
Revision]. 
 101. Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 771–72 (describing centralization options). 
 102. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) (describing need for strong enforcement mechanisms to 
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From a rational choice perspective, the extent of the ILO’s 
monitoring and enforcement challenge depends upon the strategic 
issues that international labor standards address.  If such standards 
seek to forestall a race to the bottom, states will have a strong 
incentive to defect.  Counteracting that incentive requires a robust 
and highly centralized monitoring and enforcement system.103  The 
tripartite structure adopted by the ILO’s founders—in which 
independent workers’ and employers’ groups have direct membership 
rights and can file complaints against countries that fail to comply 
with international labor standards—goes a long way toward creating 
just such a centralized system.104  If their complaints are 
substantiated, the constitution authorizes other governments to 
impose economic sanctions against the defaulting state.105 
Less centralization is required if labor standards (or at least a 
core subset of them) are viewed as universal human rights.  Nations 
that share a normative commitment to these rights should protect 
them without the need for strong monitoring or enforcement.106  The 
ILO’s detailed system of state reporting on international labor 
standards suggests that its founders endorsed this view, at least in 
part.  Reports provide an opportunity for workers, employers, and 
governments to scrutinize each state’s compliance record.107  And they 
 
encourage compliance with international law); Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 768 
(describing need for “incentive-compatible” rules). 
 103. See Robert W. Staiger, The International Organization and Enforcement of Labor 
Standards 24 (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“[E]ffective prevention 
of race-to-the-bottom/regulatory-chill problems in the context of labor standards requires that 
enforcement measures be put in place and potentially utilized.”); see also Trebilcock & Howse, 
supra note 8, at 270 (noting that proponents of the race-to-the-bottom rationale for labor 
standards argue that the race “can only be pre-empted by international agreement on and 
enforcement of minimum labor standards”). 
 104. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 409; ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, 
at 71. 
 105. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 419 (authorizing “measures of an economic 
character” for failure to follow recommendations of Commission of Enquiry or Permanent Court 
of International Justice). As I discuss more fully below, the ILO amended its constitution after 
the Second World War to remove this express reference to economic sanctions. In addition, the 
organization has never actually imposed economic sanctions, although it is on the verge of doing 
so against Myanmar for its widespread use of forced labor. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 106. Note, however, that recent works by rational choice scholars question whether states do 
in fact view human rights in this way. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 17, at 110–19 
(describing an instrumentalist logic for compliance human rights agreements). Moreover, some 
empirical evidence suggests that noncompliance with human rights treaties is often widespread.  
Id. at 122–24 (citing several supporting studies). 
 107. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 408 (requiring ILO member states to file 
annual reports “on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions 
to which it is a party” and authorizing the Director General to publicize summaries of the reports 
to the entire ILO membership). 
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create a risk of public embarrassment and censure if that record 
discloses significant gaps between a state’s behavior and its prior 
commitments.  Seen from this perspective, ILO reporting procedures 
provide a sufficient incentive for states to adhere to core labor 
standards even in the absence of strong, centralized enforcement 
mechanisms.108 
A third possibility is that international labor standards 
produce instrumental benefits for all countries, even less developed 
nations whose comparative advantage derives from low labor costs.109  
A growing number of recent empirical studies conclude that the race 
to the bottom has no empirical foundation because “[i]nvestment is 
attracted, not repelled, by adherence to core labor standards.”110  
Noncompliance is not—as the race to the bottom scenario fears—a 
deliberate if ultimately futile attempt to capture unilateral gains, but 
rather the result of misguided policies, inadequate information, or a 
lack of capacity.  If this third conception of international labor 
standards is accurate, the appropriate institutional response is a 
softer “managerial” approach to centralization that emphasizes 
information sharing and technical assistance to help ILO member 
states “develop policies which are individually and collectively 
rational.”111 
 
 108. See Weisband, supra note 8, at 648 (describing shaming as the motivating force behind 
the ILO’s monitoring regime). 
 109. Drusilla K. Brown, Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade 
Agenda?, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 102 (2001) (analyzing the “incentives for both high- and low-
income countries to choose high labor standards”). 
 110. Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 93; see also EMPLOYMENT, 
LABOUR & SOC. AFFAIRS COMM. & TRADE COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRADE, 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE (1996), available at http://213.253.134.29/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2296031E.PDF 
(demonstrating how adherence to core labor standards increases productivity and cost-
effectiveness, thereby attracting investment); Drusilla K. Brown, International Trade and Core 
Labour Standards: A Survey of the Recent Literature 45, ¶ 262 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & 
Dev., Lab. Mkt. & Soc. Pol’y Occasional Papers, Paper no. 43,  2000), available at 
http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=1167854/cl=14/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=5lgsjhvj7rwd.pdf 
(“Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that firms are more likely to invest in countries with 
some labor protections than in countries with poor labor practices, particularly with regard to 
working children.”); David Kucera, The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labour Costs and 
Foreign Direct Investment: Evaluating the “Conventional Wisdom” (Int’l Labour Org., Int’l Inst. 
for Labour Studies, Decent Work Research Programme, Discussion Paper No. DP/130/2001, 
2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp13001.pdf 
(rebutting the “conventional wisdom about low-standard countries being a haven for foreign 
investors”); Flanagan, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that available “data show no reliable 
evidence that high labor standards reduce a country’s share of” foreign direct investment). 
 111. Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 96; see also ABRAM CHAYES & 
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22–28 (1995) (advocating a “managerial approach” to promote 
compliance with international law). 
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B. The Birth of the ILO: Balancing Functional and Political Goals 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the founders of the ILO 
were motivated by three broad functional objectives.  They believed 
that all nations should be members of the organization and should 
accept the conventions and recommendations that it adopted.  They 
wanted ILO lawmaking to be sufficiently flexible to account for 
geographic and economic differences among its member states and 
changes in workplace conditions around the world.  And they sought 
to centralize the monitoring of international labor standards by 
creating a system of complaints, state reports, and information 
sharing that responded to the different (and somewhat conflicting) 
collective action problems that the organization faced.  This 
multiplicity of institutional goals belies the claim of some rational 
choice scholars that IOs are established to serve a single functional 
purpose.112 
The rational choice aspects of the ILO’s birth should not be 
overstated, however.  The founders of the organization were motivated 
by political as well as functional goals, and the design features they 
selected to promote universality, flexibility, and centralization were 
only imperfectly reflected in the ILO Constitution.113  True, the ILO’s 
distinctive tripartite structure gave actors closest to the industrial 
workplace a direct and independent voice in creating and monitoring 
international labor standards.  But in addition to these functional 
benefits of tripartism, short-term political anxieties provided an 
equally pressing motivation for the ILO’s founders to grant 
membership to non-state actors. 
Industrialized governments in Europe feared that the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 would spread communism westward, fomenting 
violent regime change elsewhere on the continent.  Better that 
workers should channel their reformist energies in an institutional 
setting than for those energies to remain pent up and eventually be 
unleashed in political unrest.  As one scholar pithily encapsulated 
these fears, “[t]he ILO was Versailles’ answer to Bolshevism.”114  For 
that answer to serve as an attractive alternative to revolution, 
however, states would need to create an IO with at least a modicum of 
independent authority and provide workers with a voice in shaping 
the exercise of that authority to create and enforce global labor 
standards. 
 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
 113. Cf. HAAS, supra note 13, at 141–42 (referring to “constitutional weaknesses built into 
the ILO Constitution”). 
 114. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 102. 
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Even acknowledging these fears of labor unrest, states were 
wary of delegating substantial autonomy to the nascent organization.  
They categorically rejected worker proposals to make labor 
conventions automatically binding in domestic legal systems.115  This 
ensured that whatever international labor standards the ILO adopted, 
governments would have the final say in deciding whether those 
standards would apply in their respective national labor markets.  In 
addition, the power of the purse and the authority to impose economic 
sanctions remained with the ILO’s parent organization, the League of 
Nations.116  By retaining an institutional umbilical cord to the 
League—an IO in which only states were members—founding 
governments believed they could retain significant control over the 
ILO and prevent it from taking actions contrary to their interests.117 
The ILO’s cabined authority is also reflected in the 
constitutional provisions describing the functions of the Director 
General and the ILO Office.  The ILO Governing Body, the executive 
organ of the ILO, appoints the Director General, who in turn appoints 
the ILO staff and manages the ILO Office “subject to the instructions 
of the Governing Body.”118  The constitution specifies the Office’s 
functions, which include collecting and distributing information, 
examining issues for future treaty-making, and preparing the agenda 
for the annual meeting of the International Labor Conference.119  More 
consequential authority, such as the power to review state reports, to 
interpret treaties, and to review complaints remained with the ILO’s 
political bodies or with the member states themselves.120 
Taken together, these constitutional provisions and the 
historical and social context in which they were fashioned reflect the 
ILO’s uneasy mix of functional and political goals and its founders’ 
equivocal endorsement of an IO tasked with creating and enforcing 
global labor standards.  Given this ambiguous constitutional 
blueprint, the ILO’s founding governments could reasonably expect 
the organization to diffuse the potential for post-war labor unrest by 
adopting treaties and recommendations to address the most pressing 
 
 115. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 32. 
 116. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 399 & 420. 
 117. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 143 (explaining how the “final power of action continued to 
rest with governments” in the League of Nations) (emphasis omitted); see generally Cox, Limited 
Monarchy, supra note 13, at 102–03 (describing the origins and development of the ILO in the 
context of the League of Nations). 
 118. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 394, ¶ 1. 
 119. Id. art. 396, ¶¶ 2–3, and 402. The Office’s agenda-setting function is subject to the right 
of any government to object to the inclusion of any item in the agenda.   
 120. See id. arts 408–20 (allocating these powers to the member states or to ILO political 
bodies). 
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safety, heath, and social problems of the early twentieth-century 
workplace.  But they would not have anticipated that the ILO would 
venture much beyond this mandate.121 
C. Early Innovations 
It was the first ILO Director General, Albert Thomas, and the 
staff of the ILO Office who, in the organization’s first two decades 
from 1919 to 1939, expanded the organization’s authority well beyond 
this restricted role.122  The Director General and the Office exploited 
constitutional ambiguities and adopted working methods to enhance 
the ILO’s functional goals notwithstanding the founders’ limited 
delegation of authority. 
These expansions of authority were facilitated by the successful 
efforts of ILO officials to cultivate support from workers’ groups.  
These officials sought to bolster organized labor—both trade unions 
participating in the ILO’s tripartite membership and those active in 
national labor markets—to foster industrial democracies in which 
workers would be equal partners with employers and governments.123  
The Director General and his staff expended considerable effort to 
strengthen domestic trade unions and encourage their participation in 
the organization.  Their aim was “to promote social justice through 
international labor standards” and to turn the ILO into the agent for 
“transforming the world into a system of pluralistic welfare societies 
closely integrated internationally.”124 
 
 121. See 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl. (identifying workplace conditions 
requiring international attention); HAAS, supra note 13, at 144 (stating that governments did not 
“feed [new] demands into the ILO because they had not expected the need for any policy” beyond 
those specified in the constitution). 
 122. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 144, 143 (recounting the “self-consciously dynamic 
polic[ies]” adopted by the first ILO Director General Albert Thomas and describing the pre-war 
evolution of the ILO as an “unintended consequence of the very immediate and expediential 
governmental concern” of its founders); E.J. PHELAN, YES AND ALBERT THOMAS 245–57 (1936) 
(reviewing competence-expanding activities of ILO’s first Director General and his support of 
worker delegates); Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour 
Organisation, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 580, 613 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) 
(“The Office plays a leadership role in promoting the objectives of the ILO . . . .  ILO officials have 
been initiators in the work of the Organisation, considering themselves not as simple executors 
of the desires of member States, but rather as collaborators in the pursuit of social justice.”). 
 123. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 145 (describing the ILO as a “coordinator and unifier of 
national trade groups”); PHELAN, supra note 122, at 240–47 (explaining Director General 
Thomas’s vision of the ILO as a collaboration of national trade unions). 
 124. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 122; see also C. WILFRED JENKS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM 519, 522 (1957) (arguing that support of 
worker organizations was essential to development of additional authority by ILO Office). 
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As I document below, ILO officials sought to achieve these 
ambitious and lofty goals in three ways: (1) by encouraging more 
nations to join the organization and to ratify worker-protection 
treaties; (2) by developing innovative lawmaking procedures to 
balance the competing demands of stability and flexibility; and (3) by 
enhancing centralized monitoring procedures to promote compliance 
with a rapidly growing body of international labor standards.  Many of 
these legal innovations have long been forgotten.  For observers in the 
inter-war period, however, the ILO was viewed as a highly effective 
organization and a model for other IOs to follow.125 
1. Promoting Widespread Membership and Treaty Ratifications 
“[O]ne of the chief preoccupations” of the first generation of  
ILO officials was to “increase the number of ILO Members as much as 
possible.”126  The ILO’s status as an offspring of the League of Nations 
presented an obstacle to expanding the organization’s geographic and 
demographic scope.  According to the constitution, all members of the 
League were automatically members of the ILO.127  But what of those 
countries—including powerful or populous nations such as the United 
States, Germany, and the Soviet Union—which refused to join the 
League or which were ineligible to become League members? 
The constitution did not address this question.  But throughout 
the 1920s, non-League members applied for and received admission to 
the organization.  Universality arguments invoking fears of a race to 
the bottom carried the day, with the existing membership accepting 
the Office’s contention that “inhuman [labor] conditions in even a 
single country may, through international competition, arrest or 
compromise social progress in every other country.”128 
 
 125. See MARK F. IMBER, THE USA, ILO, UNESCO, AND IAEA: POLITICIZATION AND 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 43 (1989) (noting the praise and respect the ILO 
received from other IOs during the inter-war period); C. Wilfred Jenks, The Need for an 
International Legislative Drafting Bureau, 39 AMER. J. INT’L L. 163, 172–73 (1945) [hereinafter 
Jenks, Legislative Drafting Bureau] (detailing the careful and effective methods of treaty-making 
in the ILO’s first two decades); Charles W. Pipkin, Relations with the League of Nations, in 
ANNALS ILO ISSUE, supra note 13, at 124, 128 (describing the successful leadership of the ILO 
during the inter-war years). 
 126. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 35; see also Josef Sulkowski, The Problem of 
Universal Membership in the International Labor Organisation 5 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 70, 70–72 (1952–53) (describing the ILO’s goal of universal 
membership). 
 127. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 387. 
 128. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 35; see also id. at 36–41 (discussing legal and 
political issues regarding admission of new members to the ILO). 
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The ILO Office quickly went to work encouraging non-members 
to join the organization.  The absence of the United States prior to 
1934 was especially troubling, and the Office did “all in its power to 
induce the United States to take part in” the work of the organization, 
establishing relationships with “official and private bodies” to 
encourage American participation and ultimately ratification.129  The 
Office also provided non-members, including the Soviet Union, with 
studies of their domestic labor problems and tried to persuade states 
to join with promises of additional information and technical 
assistance.130  In part as a result of these efforts, the ILO membership 
expanded from forty-five states at its inception in 1919 to sixty-two 
states by the mid-1930s. 
The drive to promote ratification of labor treaties evolved 
somewhat differently.  The ILO Constitution obligated member states 
to submit all conventions and recommendations to their respective 
political branches to encourage adoption of the instruments.131  But it 
soon became clear that this mandatory submission procedure would 
not ensure widespread ratification of the treaties. 
At the Office’s urging, the ILO adopted several procedural 
innovations to encourage states to ratify.  First, the Office developed 
an “exceptionally thorough and detailed” process for drafting treaties 
to ensure that each of their provisions had “been subjected to intensive 
scrutiny and discussion prior to adoption.”132  To further encourage the 
membership’s support, the ILO Conference gave two separate reviews 
to all draft conventions.133  And to make treaties more politically 
palatable, it gave governments alone the right to submit amendments 
prior to the draft’s second reading.134 
A second deterrent to ratification stemmed from ambiguous 
provisions in certain conventions.  Beginning in the early 1920s, 
governments asked the Office to clarify these ambiguities.  ILO 
officials responded cautiously to these requests, inasmuch as the 
constitution entrusted all interpretive functions to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice.135  States were unwilling, however, to 
invoke this formal adjudicatory process, and the Office responded to 
the demand for its services by providing unofficial interpretations of 
 
 129. Id. at 43. 
 130. Id. at 42–46, 328–31; ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 118–33. 
 131. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405, ¶ 5. 
 132. J.F. McMahon, The Legislative Techniques of the International Labour Organization, 41 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 93 (1965–66). 
 133. OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 148–51, 167. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 423. 
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conventions and publishing them for the benefit of the entire 
membership.136  In undertaking this new task, the Office stressed the 
technical and specialized knowledge it had acquired in drafting the 
conventions and in promoting their implementation.137  No state ever 
challenged its authority, with the result that “[t]he ILO secretariat, 
without explicit constitutional warrant, [became] the principal organ 
for rendering these effectively conclusive but formally advisory 
interpretations.”138  An important consequence of these new powers 
was the Office’s ability to reassure states that had expressed concerns 
about textual ambiguities and thereby “remove[] obstacles inhibiting 
ratification” of the treaties.139 
A third procedural innovation by which ILO officials 
encouraged treaty ratifications while simultaneously expanding their 
own authority was the Office’s practice of collecting and publishing 
information on compliance with recommendations and unratified 
conventions.140  The effects of this practice were threefold.  First, in 
the case of recommendations, the information helped to pave the way 
for the later adoption of a convention on the same subject.  Second, in 
the case of treaties, it created a fund of practical experience 
concerning domestic labor laws and practices upon which the Office 
could draw to ease the concerns of non-ratifying states.  And third, 
collecting information on both ratified and unratified conventions 
blurred the distinction between the two categories of instruments, 
reducing the consequences of ratification.141 
In practice, however, these three procedural innovations 
produced only modest results.  The total number of ratifications of all 
ILO treaties grew at a steady rate, from 27 in 1921 to 408 in 1930 to 
873 in 1939.142  But these figures amounted to only about 25% of the 
 
 136. See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Interpretation of International Labour Conventions by the 
International Labour Office, in Notes, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 132, 132–41 (1939) (detailing the 
frequency with which the Office gives unofficial interpretations); ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra 
note 91, at 276 (discussing the member states’ preference for such interpretations). 
 137. McMahon, supra note 132, at 91–96 (noting the Office’s “exceptional and special 
knowledge” in reviewing practices of ILO member states and preparing drafts of conventions). 
 138. ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 226 (internal punctuation omitted). 
 139. McMahon, supra note 132, at 100. 
 140. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 267–76, 310–12, 317–20 (discussing 
efforts by Office to overcome obstacles to ratification and to gather information on the 
implementation of recommendations). 
 141. In recent years, the Office has continued to stress the influence of unratified 
conventions and recommendations on the domestic laws and practices of member states. See 
INT’L LAB. OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 11–26 (1976) [hereinafter INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS]. 
 142. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 277; ILO, Statistics on Ratification, supra 
note 10, graph 1. 
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total possible ratifications by all member states.  As I explain in the 
next section, the ILO Office took great pains to explain why universal 
ratification was neither realistic nor, in some cases, desirable,143 even 
as it continued to press for additional ratifications by member states 
with widely different industrial and economic conditions. 
2. Creating and Revising Flexible International Labor Standards 
The drafters of the ILO Constitution recognized that 
international labor standards could not be applied uniformly in all 
countries and would need to be updated in response to changing 
workplace conditions and technological advances.  Yet they provided 
surprisingly little guidance on how to achieve these goals or on how to 
reconcile them with the organization’s competing aspirations to 
universal membership.  Again, it was the ILO Office that responded to 
these challenges. 
The Office promoted, and the ILO membership adopted, a 
systematic approach to make labor conventions and recommendations 
relevant to the diverse and changing conditions of the early 20th 
century workplace.  It distributed questionnaires to solicit information 
from governments, conducted studies of national laws and labor 
practices, and provided numerous opportunities for review and 
comment by all three branches of the ILO’s tripartite membership.  
The Office played an agenda setting role in each of these areas, 
drafting questionnaires, studies, and the texts of treaties and 
recommendations for the consideration of ILO delegates.144 
Several features of this standard setting process are 
particularly noteworthy.  First, the ILO promulgated in rapid 
succession a series of conventions and recommendations that extended 
international labor standards to an increasingly broad array of 
workers and workplace issues.145  The brisk pace of lawmaking began 
with the very first ILO Conference in 1919, where the membership 
approved six treaties.  Over the next two decades, the ILO adopted 
 
 143. See id. at 278 (stating that it would be “unreasonable” to expect ratification of maritime 
conventions by non-maritime states). But see infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text 
(describing the practice of “empty ratifications” of maritime conventions by some landlocked 
states). 
 144. See McMahon, supra note 132, at 62–65 (describing the drafting procedure); Jenks, 
Legislative Drafting Bureau, supra note 125, at 172–73 (explaining the need for a uniform 
drafting technique). 
 145. See Francis Maupain, Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers’ Rights?: Reflections on 
the Myanmar Experience, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 85, 91 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar] (discussing the expansion of the ILO’s mandate 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which held that the organization’s jurisdiction 
covered all workers). 
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sixty-one additional conventions and sixty-six separate 
recommendations.146 
Second, ILO officials attempted to strike a balance between 
standards that established a minimum baseline for all members and 
more lenient standards for countries with less advanced economies 
and labor markets.147  The Office developed a dual strategy to achieve 
these competing goals.  First, it successfully resisted attempts by 
member states to file reservations to the treaties after they had been 
adopted.  It justified this position—one without precedent in 
international law—on the ground that reservations were inconsistent 
with the ILO’s tripartite structure and with its objective of 
establishing “a network of mutual obligations” that would prevent 
states from entering a race to the bottom in their scramble for a 
greater share of global trade and investment.148 
In the place of these unilateral exclusions, the ILO Office 
promoted a diverse array of flexibility devices to customize treaties to 
fit different economic, social, and geographic conditions.  Some 
conventions identified specific countries (usually developing nations) 
and the differential (usually lower) standards that applied to them.  
Others contained only general principles, with more detailed rules 
relegated to accompanying recommendations on the same topic.  Still 
other treaties permitted ratification in parts or allowed states to 
exclude the treaty’s application to designated industries or categories 
of workers.149  These diverse textual approaches helped to make the 
treaties more relevant and more politically palatable to a broad cross-
section of ILO member states. 
A third flexibility issue the organization confronted concerned 
the revision of treaties.  The ILO’s founders recognized that workplace 
conditions and workers’ needs would change rapidly over time.  But 
they failed to provide any procedures for amending outdated 
conventions.150  As a result of this missing joist in the constitutional 
architecture, the ILO could not revise or abrogate a treaty after it had 
 
 146. Nicolas Valticos, Fifty Years of Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour 
Organisation, 135 INT’L LAB. REV. 393, 399 (1996). 
 147. See id. at 402. 
 148. McMahon, supra note 132, at 80; see also id. at 77–85 (discussing history of and 
rationales for ban on reservations). 
 149. See J.M. Servais, Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards, 125 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 193 (1986) (detailing the flexibility devices used in ILO conventions); VALTICOS & VON 
POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 55–61 (same). 
 150. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 33 (describing the founders’ awareness 
that ILO would need to address new labor issues in the future); id. at 86 (stating that the 
problem of revision of conventions “is not mentioned” in the Constitution of 1919 but “it was 
bound to arise sooner or later”). 
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entered into force.  The only permissible alternative was to adopt a 
second convention on the same subject.  A state wishing to adopt the 
newer standard would then ratify the “revising convention” and 
formally denounce the earlier treaty.151  Yet the earlier treaties 
continued to remain in force for countries that wished to retain the 
older standards.152  This was a cumbersome solution to the problem of 
treaty revision, since it created new treaties without eliminating old 
ones.153  But it enabled the ILO Office to close the gap in the 
constitution and provided—at least temporarily—a mechanism to 
update international labor rules.154 
3. Enhancing Centralized Monitoring 
With a growing membership and an expanding corpus of labor 
standards, the ILO Office naturally turned its attention to issues of 
monitoring and compliance.  As described above, the ILO Constitution 
provided two ways to review state behavior—annual reports on 
ratified conventions and complaints by workers, employers, or 
governments.155  But the constitution failed to address numerous 
procedural details, leaving ample room for ILO officials to propose 
functional solutions that resulted in a marked expansion of the 
organization’s monitoring powers.156 
The earliest and most important innovation involved the 
creation of a permanent body of independent experts to review reports 
filed by member states on ratified treaties.  The constitution entrusted 
 
 151. Jenks, Revision, supra note 100, at 49–52. 
 152. E.g., Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) Convention, art. 7, ¶¶ 2–3, 
June 21, 1929, ILOLEX No. C27, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm 
(providing that, on the date that a revising convention entered into force, the original convention 
would be closed to future ratifications but would remain in force for those states that had 
previously ratified it). 
 153. Maritime labor treaties provide an apt illustration. The ILO Conference adopted the 
first Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention in 1946. June 29, 1946, ILOLEX No. 
C76, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. The treaty was followed three 
years later, however, by the Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 
1949, and nine years after that by a second revising convention, Wages, Hours of Work and 
Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1958. June 18, 1949, ILOLEX No. C93, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm; May 14, 1958, ILOLEX No. C109, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 
 154. As I explain in the next section, this approach to treaty revision later created problems 
for the organization. See infra Part III.E.2. 
 155. For detailed discussions, see OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 171–83, 210–34; T.K. Samson, 
The Changing Pattern of ILO Supervision, 118 INT’L LAB. REV. 569, 569–80 (1979). 
 156. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 251 (describing expanding reporting obligations for member 
states); id. at 348–50 (comparing constitutionally mandated procedures with those that have 
been developed ad hoc by the ILO); JENKS, ILO IMPACT, supra note 13, at 42 (explaining changes 
in supervisory procedures). 
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the review of these reports to the Director General, but it soon became 
clear that he could not process the vast quantity of information that 
states provided.  In the mid-1920s, a few governments proposed a 
standing committee to consider state reports.  Mollified by assurances 
from the Office that the committee would be limited to the technical 
issue of comparing national laws to treaty texts, the remaining 
member states agreed to the proposal.157 
Once created, however, the “Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations” quickly enlarged 
its authority.  With the support of information from worker delegates, 
the Committee sought out additional information from governments, 
and it asked for an evaluation of the problems that they had 
encountered in giving domestic effect to the treaties.  Armed with this 
knowledge, the Committee could engage in pointed exchanges with 
state representatives and offer specific recommendations for remedial 
action.158  By the end of the interwar period, the Committee of Experts 
had become a “mainstay of ILO supervision.”159 
Procedures for convening a Commission of Inquiry to review 
allegations of noncompliance followed a different evolutionary 
pathway.  No state invoked these procedures during the ILO’s first 
two decades.160  But the ILO Office helped to establish an important 
precedent that expanded the pool of potential complainants when it 
confirmed that an ambiguous provision in the constitution allowed 
workers and employers to request a Commission of Inquiry.161  The 
Office thus transformed a procedure that many governments would 
have preferred to be restricted to interstate complaints—a form of 
 
 157. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 252; OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 173. 
 158. An early observer noted that the Committee of Experts “presents critical observations, 
acknowledges responses of governments, discusses them, refutes them, formulates commentaries 
on the interpretations presented, and advances suggestions.” HAAS, supra note 13, at 253 
(translating and quoting JEAN ZARRAS, LE CONTROLE DE L’APPLICATION DES CONVENTIONS 
INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL 173 (1937)). Committee members were careful, however, to couch 
their conclusions in the form of “observations” rather than “criticisms.” Id. 
 159. Samson, supra note 155, at 569. 
 160. See ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 280 (describing first Commission of Inquiry, convened in 
1961 to respond to a complaint by Ghana against Portugal); HAAS, supra note 13, at 362 (same). 
 161. See OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 223 & n.124 (noting legal dispute over whether workers 
and employers could submit complaints that could trigger the creation of a Commission of 
Inquiry). 
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treaty monitoring that is often underutilized162—into one in which 
workers and employers could raise compliance challenges directly.163 
4. Theoretical Assessment 
From a theoretical perspective, the expansion of lawmaking 
and monitoring during the ILO’s first two decades closely tracks the 
predictions of neofunctionalism.  The Director General and the ILO 
Office acted as autonomous agents with interests distinct from those 
of the states that created their positions.  Officials brought about 
change endogenously and incrementally, seeking support from worker 
delegates at the ILO, building connections to national trade unions, 
and using their expertise in information gathering, analysis, and 
agenda setting to shape the demands and expectations of member 
states. 
These events also provide an opportunity to assess rational 
choice and historical institutionalist accounts of change in IOs.  Most 
obviously, the historical narrative reveals that the behavior of IOs 
cannot be explained, as some rational choice theories claim, by 
examining state interests alone or by an analysis that is frozen at a 
specific moment in time.  Rational choice analysis is, however, useful 
for identifying the functional objectives of an IO’s founders and the 
design features they select to achieve them.  It is these goals and 
design choices, in turn, that shape the strategies for change deployed 
by first-generation IO officials and staff. 
Notably, the Director General and the Office did not expand 
lawmaking and monitoring authority by means of a raw power grab.  
Such an attempt surely would have provoked a backlash from member 
states.  Instead, officials made common cause with organized labor 
while stressing the universality, flexibility, and centralization goals 
that had animated the organization since its inception.  They justified 
each modest expansion on functional grounds, taking small individual 
steps that ultimately produced a substantial expansion of the 
organization’s powers from within.  This process echoes some 
historical institutionalist accounts of how domestic institutions evolve, 
a process characterized by “incremental change with transformative 
results.”164 
 
 162. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International 
Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 779 (1994) (describing limitations of interstate dispute 
settlement procedures). 
 163. Recent Commissions of Inquiry have been overwhelmingly requested by non-state 
actors. See VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 290–93. 
 164. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 9. 
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The endogenous changes that occurred during the ILO’s first 
twenty years did not, however, insulate the ILO from exogenous 
shocks.  The Great Depression of the 1930s presented a serious 
challenge to the organization, generating acrimonious divisions among 
workers, employers, and governments that resulted in a slow-down of 
treaty ratifications and the rejection of half a dozen draft conventions 
intended to mitigate the depression’s labor-related hardships.165  But 
ILO officials made limited progress even on these contentious topics, 
for example by successfully advocating for the adoption of a new 
convention regulating the length of the work week.166  Far more 
importantly, they preserved their expanded authority over ILO 
lawmaking and monitoring—no small feat in the face of a sharp 
downturn in the global economy and the soon-to-be fatal political 
challenges to its parent organization, the League of Nations. 
D. Post-War Transitions and Subject Matter Expansions 
The innovations described in the previous section enabled the 
ILO to create international labor standards that responded to 
changing workplace conditions and to the evolving demands of its 
tripartite membership.  But these adaptive efforts also helped the 
organization to weather the cataclysmic changes that occurred during 
and after the Second World War.  During the hostilities, the ILO 
decamped from its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland to Montreal, 
Canada.167  Lawmaking, treaty ratifications, and monitoring slowed to 
a crawl and the organization’s membership shrank with the 
withdrawal of the Axis Powers and countries in their orbit.168 
As the war neared its end, attention shifted to the ILO’s future.  
Aware that the League would not survive the conflict, ILO officials 
and worker organizations sought to position the organization to take 
the preeminent role in social and economic aspects of the post-war 
geopolitical order.169  The Declaration of Philadelphia, adopted in May 
 
 165. See ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 99 (describing decline in ratifications); id. at 110–12 
(outlining failure to adopt conventions concerning unemployment and social security). 
 166. See id. at 110 (discussing the Forty-Hour Week Convention, June 4, 1935, ILOLEX No. 
C47, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm); see also Cox, General Theory of 
IO, supra note 63, at 102 (stating that at “critical moments in [the ILO’s] history, its leadership 
has put forward bold programs” and citing the “anti-depression program” of Director General 
Harold Butler). 
 167. ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 160–61. 
 168. Id. at 151–70, 171 n.1 (discussing the ILO’s activities during World War II); VALTICOS & 
VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 33 (stating that ILO membership fell from sixty-two states in 
the 1930s to forty-eight states in the early 1940s). 
 169. See Edward Phelan, Acting Dir., Int’l Lab. Office, Address at the International Labour 
Conference (May 10, 1944), in INT’L LAB. OFFICE, “A NEW ERA”: THE PHILADELPHIA CONFERENCE 
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1944, provided the blueprint for a redefinition of the ILO’s goals.  In 
addition to lofty aspirational statements endorsing individual 
freedom, economic security, and poverty eradication, the Declaration 
set out an ambitious agenda of social and economic policy reforms.170  
The Declaration’s drafters intended these statements to broaden the 
organization’s mandate, and, in so doing, “to define the part the ILO 
should play in the new order of economic co-operation to be 
established by the United Nations.”171 
Securing a place in the new political order was no easy task.  
The ILO was “an embarrassing reminder of the League,”172 and the 
Soviet Union believed that its interests would be better served in 
other forums.173  In the end, the ILO settled for autonomy rather than 
primacy.  It entered into an agreement with the United Nations 
designating it as a specialized agency of that multilateral body, but 
not before overhauling the Constitution of 1919 to enshrine its 
expanded social and economic mandate.  The new Constitution of 
1946174 incorporated the Declaration of Philadelphia as an Annex.  
But it also recognized the ILO’s autonomy over its budget and 
membership (both problematic aspects of its relationship to the now 
defunct League) and augmented its lawmaking and monitoring 
functions.175  With respect to the latter issue, the most significant 
change required states to report on the extent of their compliance with 
unratified ILO conventions and to indicate the impediments that 
prevented or delayed such treaties’ future ratification.176 
 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE I.L.O. 132–45 (1944) (discussing the post-war future of the ILO); see also 
HAAS, supra note 13, at 152 (noting that, in response to “the very real challenge of a drastically 
changed international environment,” the ILO Office increasingly “assumed the role of the leader 
and executive, the initiator and promoter of policy”). 
 170. Int’l Lab. Org., Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International 
Labour Organization (adopted May 10, 1944 in Philadelphia), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex. The specific policy goals included 
promoting full employment, raising living standards, recognizing the right of collective 
bargaining, protecting life and health in all occupations, and protecting equality of educational 
and vocational opportunity. Id. 
 171. ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 184. 
 172. Id. at 171. 
 173. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 104 (describing the Soviet Union’s preference 
“that labor interests be expressed directly through the new United Nations machinery”); VICTOR-
YVES GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION 
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Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter 1946 ILO Constitution]. 
 175. HAAS, supra note 13, at 161–66; see also VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 
19, 46–47 (arguing that the Declaration of Philadelphia expanded the ILO’s regulatory 
authority). 
 176. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 19.5(e). 
  
692 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:3:649 
Taken together, the Declaration and the new constitution 
appeared to presage an influential role for the ILO.  The organization 
quickly returned to a rapid pace of treaty-making, using the 
procedures that ILO officials had developed in the 1920s and 1930s.177  
But this lawmaking activity, and the monitoring functions that 
inevitably accompanied it, occurred in an environment that had 
changed radically from the one in which the ILO operated before the 
war.  Three factors in particular shaped the ILO’s activities during the 
post-war period: (1) an expanded and increasingly diverse group of 
member states and worker and employer representatives; (2) 
competition with other IOs; and (3) a prolonged period of economic 
prosperity.  As I explain below, these three changes acted as catalysts 
that vastly expanded the ILO’s subject matter mandate. 
First, the number of ILO member states increased rapidly in 
the 1950s and 1960s, initially when the Soviet Union and other 
socialist nations joined or rejoined the organization and later as 
former colonies in Africa and Asia gained independence.  With the 
admission of these new members, the ILO became a site of trenchant 
Cold War clashes between East and West (which took the form of 
challenges to the independence of worker delegations from socialist 
nations and reciprocal claims that those countries were violating 
forced labor standards) and decolonization battles between North and 
South (which were reflected in politically-motivated challenges to 
labor practices in South Africa, in former colonial powers, and in 
Israel).178  As before the war, the Director General and the ILO Office 
continued to press for new initiatives in particular subject areas.179  
But these independent efforts by ILO officials now competed with new 
demands of governments and workers from developing countries, 
leading to “greater heterogeneity of ideologies and objectives among 
 
 177. See GERARD J. MANGONE, A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 226 
(1954) (describing post-war efforts to draft additional labor conventions). 
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These politically motivated events were the catalyst of the temporary withdrawal of the United 
States from the ILO between 1977 and 1980. See IMBER, supra note 125, at 58 (analyzing 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States’ withdrawal was 
precipitated by, inter alia, the ILO’s “disregard for due process and increasing politicization”). 
 179. See MORSE, supra note 2, at 45–76 (describing initiatives promoted by Director General 
between 1948 and 1968). 
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the membership.”180  The result was a vast “proliferation of program 
demands.”181 
Second, the ILO experienced new forms of competition from 
other international bodies, in particular from the human rights 
activities of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.182  In 
the late 1940s and 1950s, the ILO vied for policy dominance with this 
new rival by adopting human rights treaties on forced labor, freedom 
of association, and equality in employment.183  The ILO Office also 
sought to influence human rights treaties drafted in the United 
Nations by providing expert analysis of their labor rights provisions.184  
Finally, the ILO created—contrary to the wishes of some UN human 
rights officials—a specialized monitoring body to protect the rights of 
trade unions.185  This new Committee on Freedom of Association soon 
developed into a “major innovation” in ILO monitoring, reviewing 
numerous workers’ complaints against countries regardless of whether 
they had ratified ILO treaties protecting freedom of association.186  As 
these examples illustrate, competition with other IOs spurred a 
marked expansion of ILO activities relating to human rights. 
Third and finally, favorable economic circumstances helped to 
foment an expansion of the ILO’s competence.  “‘[T]hirty glorious’ 
years” of post-war prosperity and growth in industrialized countries 
“encouraged governments and enterprises to show generosity” in 
 
 180. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 105; see also Efrén Córdova, Some Reflections 
on the Overproduction of International Labor Standards, 14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 138, 144 (1993) 
(describing how worker groups “press for inclusion of standards specific to their sector in the 
International Labor Code”); HAAS, supra note 13, at 167, 242 (discussing demand for new labor 
standards in former colonial territories). 
 181. HAAS, supra note 13, at 171. 
 182. See Leary, supra note 122, at 587–88. 
 183. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 166–68; see also Fundamental ILO Conventions, available 
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/ (listing dates of adoption of 
ILO human rights treaties). 
 184. See Philip Alston, The United Nations’ Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
79, 94 (1979); Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the 
Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 480–81 (2004). 
 185. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS 83–84 (1984) 
(discussing the UN’s desire for a joint UN-ILO commission to protect trade union rights); Leary, 
supra note 122, at 602–03 (discussing UN opposition to ILO Freedom of Association Committee). 
 186. Philip Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International 
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 481 (2004). The authority to review the conduct of 
non-ratifying states derived from the ILO Constitution, which protects freedom of association. 
“[It] has therefore been held that this principle should be observed by all [member states] by 
virtue of their membership [in] the Organization alone.” VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 
3, at 295. 
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response to worker demands.187  This generosity enabled the 
organization to make good on the promises of the Declaration of 
Philadelphia by extending ILO treaty-making into “broad subjects of 
employment and social policies.”188  During this period, the 
organization adopted conventions and recommendations on subjects as 
diverse as welfare, workers’ education and training, rural 
development, colonial working conditions, and workers’ health and 
medical benefits.189 
E. Institutional Stagnation 
The previous section reviewed three factors—a larger, more 
diverse and more assertive membership, competition with the newly-
created United Nations, and a prolonged period of global economic 
prosperity—that acted as catalysts for expanding the ILO’s activities.  
As before the war, the organization continued to draft detailed 
regulations for specific industries and workplace problems.  But it also 
broadened its subject matter focus to include new initiatives in human 
rights, social policy, and economic development. 
At first, ILO officials successfully managed the more wide-
ranging lawmaking and monitoring activities that these changes 
precipitated.  Over time, however, the expansion of the ILO’s functions 
exposed deeper institutional problems.  In particular, it revealed that 
the innovations relating to universality, flexibility, and centralization 
that ILO officials had introduced during the organization’s first two 
decades were ill-suited to a more diverse and more politicized 
membership and to ambitious forays into controversial subjects at the 
core of national sovereignty.  To the contrary, these pre-war 
innovations—when applied in a markedly changed post-war 
environment—created dysfunctional incentives and pathological 
behaviors that impeded the organization’s effectiveness. 
The changing composition and interests of workers’ 
organizations was an important factor in precipitating these negative 
changes.  As described above, national trade unions provided strong 
support for the social justice mission espoused by the first generation 
of ILO officials.190  As a member of the ILO and of domestic interests 
groups, organized labor provided a key link between the organization 
and the domestic politics of its member states.  Trade unions lobbied 
 
 187. Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 93 n.25. 
 188. Córdova, supra note 180, at 143. 
 189. Id. at 142–43. 
 190. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing support of worker groups 
for ILO Office during the organization’s first two decades). 
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governments to ratify ILO conventions, to implement labor protections 
in national laws and collective bargaining agreements, and to support 
(or at least acquiesce in) the expansion of ILO officials’ authority.  “To 
be effective instruments of pressure within countries,” however, “trade 
unions would have to be strong and independent of state control or 
domination.”191 
Maintaining the independence of organized labor presented 
little problem when the ILO’s members were nearly all from 
industrialized democracies.  But it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain with the inclusion of labor delegates from socialist and 
developing countries.  Challenges to the accreditation of “pseudo-
delegates” of worker organizations from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe have been well documented,192 as have ILO officials’ efforts to 
strengthen nascent trade unions in newly independent (and 
democratically shaky) countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.193  
Yet as national labor groups diversified, the workers’ representatives 
at the ILO remained in “the hands of trade union functionaries who 
head[ed] old, entrenched organizations representing, overwhelmingly, 
democratic and industrialized national settings.”194  The result was a 
disconnect between labor groups operating internationally and those 
active in domestic politics, a divide that constricted a crucial pipeline 
of support that ILO officials had cultivated during the organization’s 
earlier decades.   
1. Perverse Lawmaking Incentives 
Beginning in the late 1940s, the ILO churned out a steady 
stream of new conventions using the lawmaking procedures it had 
adopted before the war.195  As the organization’s legislative output 
increased, however, ILO officials noticed a disturbing and increasingly 
common trend: many of these new treaties were sparsely ratified.196  
 
 191. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 122. 
 192. Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 90. 
 193. HAAS, supra note 13, at 192. 
 194. Id. at 201; see also id. at 199–202 (discussing the dominance that the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions exercised over other trade union groups in the ILO during 
the 1950s and 1960s). 
 195. See Valticos, supra note 146, at 401 (stating that ILO adopted sixty-three conventions 
and sixty-eight recommendations between 1944 and 1969). 
 196. See Boockmann, supra note 10, at 292; Cooney, supra note 9, at 376. A 2000 ILO study 
found that ratification rates for different categories of conventions—such as labor 
administration, working conditions, social security, and safety and health—ranged between 
approximately 15% and 35% of ILO member states. Only “fundamental conventions,” including 
human rights treaties, had significantly higher ratification rates—around 68% of member states. 
ILO, Statistics on Ratification, supra note 10, graph 7. 
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The ILO’s tripartite structure might predictably produce this result 
where the membership adopted a treaty with strong backing from 
employers and workers, but only limited support from governments.197  
But the ILO adopted nearly all post-war conventions unanimously or 
with supermajority governmental support.198  In addition, the 
Constitution of 1946 obligated member states to convey newly-adopted 
treaties to their respective parliaments for approval and to provide 
compliance information for treaties that domestic lawmakers 
ultimately chose to reject.199  These new obligations should have 
increased the pressure on ILO members to ratify the treaties. 
A rational choice framework that examines the conduct of 
nation states alone cannot account for this paucity of treaty 
ratifications.  But by disaggregating states into their governmental 
components, and by considering the independent interests of IO 
officials, the perverse incentives for ILO treaty-making without treaty 
implementation are revealed. 
The different identity of representatives voting for treaties in 
the ILO and those voting to make those treaties binding in domestic 
law provides a partial explanation for the sparse number of 
ratifications.  In the ILO, workers and employers have direct 
participation rights; in national legislatures, they have only indirect 
influence and must compete with other interest groups for legislators’ 
attentions.  This distinction was especially prevalent in socialist and 
developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, many of which were 
run by centralized governments that tightly controlled both domestic 
labor groups and the treaty ratification process.  Seen from this 
perspective, the ILO Office’s desire to expand the number of member 
states exacerbated the incentive for the ILO to adopt treaties that 
garnered only meager ratifications. 
The different identities of international and domestic 
lawmakers cannot, however, explain why government delegates 
supported treaties that they could readily anticipate would be rejected 
at home.  It was the structure of ILO lawmaking that permitted these 
delegates to engage in a reverse two-level game,200 voting in favor of 
 
 197. Recall that each state nominates two government delegates, one employer delegate, and 
one worker delegate to the ILO Conference, and that a two-thirds vote is required to adopt a 
treaty. See supra note 3. 
 198. See TORSTEN LANDELIUS, WORKERS, EMPLOYERS AND GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF DELEGATIONS AND GROUPS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919–1964, 
at 66–91 (1965). 
 199. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, arts. 19.5–6. 
 200. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 
42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (arguing that international politics shapes how national governments 
pursue state interests and how those interests are in turn defined through domestic politics). 
  
2006] GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO 697 
treaties that their national parliaments were likely to reject (a 
rejection made more likely by the ILO’s practice of barring unilateral 
reservations).201  Aware that the decision to bind their respective 
countries would take place at a later date and in a different forum, 
government delegates could support the demands of other delegates 
who favored the adoption of new conventions.  In one version of this 
game, government delegates traded their current votes in exchange 
for promises of support for future initiatives they themselves favored.  
In another, “logics of appropriateness” rather than “logics of 
consequences”202 diminished resistance to new treaty-making and 
allowed delegates “to lend their ears to arguments based solely on 
principles, rationality and social justice.”203 
A little-known provision of the amended ILO Constitution also 
provided an incentive for ILO officials to encourage the adoption of 
treaties that had little hope of widespread adherence.  This provision 
required member states to disclose the extent to which they had 
complied with unratified conventions and recommendations and to 
identify the obstacles to future ratification.204  Anecdotal evidence—
widely cited and praised in ILO studies of the period—indicated that 
these reports had led many governments to modify their national laws 
even when they had not ratified the treaties nor endorsed the 
corresponding recommendations.205  As a result, the adoption of 
conventions with only dim prospects of ratification would nevertheless 
enhance the authority of the ILO Office by providing an additional 
mechanism for ILO officials to influence state behavior.206 
 
 201. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 202. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 5–6 (1999). 
 203. Córdova, supra note 180, at 161. 
 204. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 19.5(e). Other scholars, employing public 
choice theory, have argued that international bureaucrats seek to expand their authority and 
discretion through the creation or interpretation of international rules. See Paul B. Stephan, 
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 681, 706, 718–19 (1996–97). As noted in the text, however, the ILO Constitution contains 
unique features that exacerbate these public choice concerns. 
 205. E.A. Landy, The Influence of International Labour Standards: Possibilities and 
Performance, 101 INT’L LAB. REV. 555, 563–64 (1970) [hereinafter Landy, Influence of 
Standards]; see INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS, supra note 141, at 25–26 n.5 (citing 
Landy article with approval). 
 206. See Córdova, supra note 180, at 161–62; Ignacio A. Donoso Rubio, Economic Limits on 
International Regulation: A Case Study of ILO Standard-Setting, 24 QUEENS L.J. 189, 235 
(1998); see also INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS, supra note 141, at 25–26 (stating 
that reports on unratified conventions “have a dynamic effect in occasioning a re-examination by 
governments, employers, and workers of the adequacy of national law and practice and 
consideration by the ILO of the need for reinforcing its own activities”) (emphasis added). 
  
698 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:3:649 
2. Normative Incoherence 
Putting to one side the perverse incentives that favored the 
adoption of treaties that were unlikely to be widely ratified, post-war 
ILO lawmaking became increasingly convoluted and normatively 
incoherent. 
The treaties that comprised the rapidly expanding body of 
international labor law were formally equal in status but highly 
variable in content.  A handful of treaties protected fundamental 
rights, but most concerned narrow, technical subjects.207  Yet all 
conventions were subject to identical monitoring requirements.  This 
absence of hierarchy created an uncoordinated “cafeteria approach” in 
which states were free to “pick and choose” which treaties to ratify 
without regard to their normative value.208  Grouping treaties together 
in this haphazard way also cheapened the value of those few treaties 
that ILO officials viewed as fundamental.  As one commentator 
pointedly remarked, “Such well-known and highly praised 
instruments as those dealing with hours of work, abolition of forced 
labor, freedom of association, and equality of opportunity and 
treatment lose prominence when they are lumped in the same 
category with those dealing with the certification of ships’ cooks or 
paid educational leave.”209 
A second coherence problem arose from the cumbersome rules 
for revising treaties.  As described above, the absence of amendment 
procedures in the ILO Constitution required states to adopt “revising 
conventions” to update international labor rules.210  These new 
conventions supplemented, but did not replace, older treaties 
addressing the same subject.  Over time, families of closely related 
treaties on the same topic came to occupy an increasingly large 
component of international labor law.211  Many of the original 
conventions in these families were outdated; some treaties even 
conflicted with each other.  But because the ILO had no power to 
abrogate the earlier treaties, they remained in force for some member 
 
 207. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 247 (distinguishing between general and specific 
conventions). 
 208. Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO 
Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439, 444 (2005) 
[hereinafter Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat]. 
 209. Córdova, supra note 180, at 151 (references to individual treaty numbers omitted). 
 210. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 211. Nicolas Valticos, The Future Prospects for International Labour Standards, 118 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 679, 685 (1979) (stating that, as of 1979, 40 of 150 ILO conventions were revisions of 
earlier conventions); Valticos, supra note 146, at 404 (stating that, as of 1969, 25 of 130 ILO 
conventions were revisions of earlier conventions). 
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states.  This increased reporting and monitoring burdens for states 
and ILO officials and freighted the corpus of international labor rules 
with a sizable number of treaties that were nothing more than dead 
weight. 
A third and final coherence difficulty concerned the degree to 
which conventions accommodated national differences through 
flexibility clauses.  Some governments and commentators argued that 
pre-war and early post-war treaties were overly rigid and detailed, 
making them relevant only to industrialized countries.212  The ILO 
Office responded to these criticisms by including more flexibility 
provisions in many (but not all) new conventions.  The result was that 
more recent treaties were often weaker than their predecessors.213  Yet 
many of the states that had argued most vociferously for greater 
flexibility rarely invoked these clauses when ratifying the new 
treaties.214  This raised the question of just how seriously these 
governments were taking their treaty commitments, an issue I discuss 
in the next section. 
3. Inadequate Monitoring Standards 
Notwithstanding the perverse incentives and incoherence 
problems described above, many ILO member states ratified at least a 
few of the post-war conventions.215  For these treaties, detailed 
empirical studies conducted during the 1960s concluded that the ILO 
had a compliance record “of which any international agency can be 
intensely proud.”216  These statements suggest that the monitoring 
mechanisms developed by the first generation of ILO officials were 
highly effective at influencing state behavior. 
A more detailed analysis belies these sanguine views, however.  
In particular, the standards that ILO officials used to assess member 
states’ actions were incomplete or inaccurate in several important 
respects.  In addition, the findings generated in response to these 
 
 212. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 373 (commenting that ILO conventions and 
recommendations set targets “that only the richest countries could realistically achieve”); Rubio, 
supra note 206, at 211 (discussing inflexibility of ILO conventions). 
 213. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 246 (“Conventions found to be too demanding are often 
revised downward by later conferences; upward revisions occur less often.”). 
 214. Servais, supra note 149, at 196–97. 
 215. Although ratification rates remained low for many treaties, the total number of 
ratifications rose during the half-century following World War II. ILO, Statistics on Ratification, 
supra note 10, at 2 & graph 1 (total ratifications of all ILO conventions increased from 908 in 
1944, to 3527 in 1969, to 6255 in 1994). 
 216. HAAS, supra note 13, at 258; see also LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 198 
(reaching a similar conclusion). 
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assessments appeared in a highly stylized form that was difficult for 
those outside the ILO to comprehend and that limited their ability to 
influence state behavior. 
The most simplistic evaluation measure was a simple head 
count of treaty ratifications.  This metric, however, ignored the fact 
that some ratifications were “empty” or “bogus,” acts in which a 
country “accept[ed] standards for which there was little or no basis in 
national law and practice.”217  The ratification of maritime labor 
conventions by landlocked and navy-less Luxembourg was a widely 
cited—and widely derided—example.218  Empty ratifications of this 
sort were useless, but they had few negative consequences.  Far more 
serious were cases in which “ratification was undertaken lightly 
without seriously considering the implications for the economy.”  
Governments in this situation sometimes “def[ied] the authority of the 
Organization” by failing to submit reports or by refraining from 
enacting the legislation necessary to implement the treaties.219 
Confusion over how to evaluate state behavior made it difficult 
for ILO officials to determine the extent of this recalcitrance.  The 
post-war growth in the number of treaties, of member states, and of 
reporting obligations increased the burdens on the Committee of 
Experts—the entity charged with reviewing state reports on ratified 
labor conventions.220  One response to these increased pressures was 
to analyze only the implementation of conventions (whether states 
had adopted formal legislation to give effect to the treaties) rather 
than examining the more challenging and time-consuming issues of 
compliance (whether governments actually enforced that legislation or 
otherwise adhered to the treaty) or effectiveness (whether the treaty 
 
 217. LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 83–84; see also Córdova, supra note 180, at 
155–56 (discussing rise of “hasty and spurious forms of ratification”). 
 218. See LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 84–86; see also Córdova, supra note 180, at 
156 (listing Luxembourg’s ratification of maritime conventions as an example of a bogus 
ratification); Strang & Chang, supra note 3, at 243 & n.36 (characterizing as “implausible” 
Luxembourg’s ability to implement maritime conventions). 
 219. HAAS, supra note 13, at 268. 
 220. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The continuous output of conventions and 
recommendations vastly enlarged the Committee’s workload. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 253 
(discussing Committee’s roles and functions); see also id. at 257 (stating that Committee of 
Experts reviewed government reports concerning more than 3,200 ratifications between 1927 
and 1963). To address the backlog, the ILO increased the interval between the submission of 
reports from annually to once every two years, and then once every four years for most 
conventions. See Samson, supra note 155, at 570. In another time- and cost-saving measure, the 
Committee began to publish only its most important “observations;” its remaining comments 
were simply forwarded to governments for their review. See id. 
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actually altered the behavior of governments and provided greater 
legal protections for workers).221 
The focus on implementation, however, provided an incomplete 
picture of member state behavior.  For example, a comprehensive 
empirical study conducted in the early 1960s found that nearly 75% of 
ILO conventions were fully implemented at the time states ratified 
them.222  This statistic is impressive, but should not be confused with 
a finding that the conventions actually improved domestic labor 
standards.  In some instances, treaty standards were so vague that 
ratifying states could easily enact a “law that conformed fully to the 
criteria set forth in the convention but that was at the same time 
operationally meaningless.”223  Conventions of this sort had high 
implementation rates but produced little improvement in national 
labor practices.  In other instances, governments ratified only 
conventions whose standards “their domestic politics and policies 
ha[d] already met.”224  For these treaties, compliance was perfect, but 
effectiveness was negligible, since the treaties merely “reflect[ed] 
previously attained labor conditions.”225 
ILO officials eventually recognized the need to review 
compliance and effectiveness as well as implementation.226  Yet even 
as the organization attempted to improve its assessment measures, 
preexisting modes of ILO monitoring made it difficult to evaluate state 
behavior accurately and objectively. 
As noted above, ILO member states had been wary of creating 
a Committee of Experts in the 1920s to review their compliance 
 
 221. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 377 (“[W]here a convention is . . . ratified, the [ILO] 
monitoring system considers whether or not a country’s legal system complies with that 
convention, and essentially stops there.”); WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN VIEW 214–15 (1981) (noting resistance of ILO officials to “prob[ing] 
more deeply into the actual implementation of legislation and its effect on social and economic 
conditions” in ratifying states); LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 57 (noting that the 
“primary emphasis” of supervision is on “the achievement of legislative conformity” with ILO 
conventions). 
 222. Strang & Chang, supra note 3, at 242 (reporting that Landy’s study of ILO monitoring 
between 1927 and 1963 found 73% full implementation); see LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 
13, at 66 (reporting that, in 72% of ratifications during this period, the Committee of Experts 
made no “observations” on states’ failure to comply). 
 223. GALENSON, supra note 221, at 210 (applying this example to the ILO convention 
requiring the establishment of minimum wages “for all wage earners whose terms of 
employment are such that coverage would be appropriate”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 224. Flanagan, supra note 11, at 35. 
 225. Id. at 29. This argument assumes that states did not improve their national labor 
practices in anticipation of subsequently ratifying the ILO conventions. 
 226. Cf. Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat, supra note 208, at 442 (arguing that ILO 
initiatives should be measured by whether “they make a verifiable contribution to the 
advancement of the Organization’s objectives in the real world”). 
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records.  To reduce potential resistance, the Committee couched its 
comments to governments in the form of “observations” rather than 
“criticisms.”227  Over time, the observations evolved into a highly 
stylized and understated language.  Thus, for example, when the 
Committee identified a state’s behavior “‘with concern’ or ‘with regret’, 
those phrases [were] meant to be understood as a serious criticism of a 
government’s failure to implement a convention.”228 
The Committee’s circumspect approach was appropriate for an 
early twentieth century international monitoring body seeking to 
overcome resistance from governments.  But it was a highly inefficient 
way for a more mature IO to monitor treaty compliance.229  The 
Committee’s exquisitely enigmatic condemnations of states may have 
been intelligible to old ILO hands, but they were hardly 
comprehensible to those outside the organization.230 
The different compositions of worker representatives in the 
ILO and in domestic labor markets exacerbated this lack of 
transparency.231  The disconnect between these two groups—especially 
in socialist and developing countries—limited the ability of ILO 
officials to cultivate a constituency that could translate the 
Committee’s opaque criticisms into politically salient language and 
use them to pressure governments to improve their domestic labor 
practices.232  The result was that the ILO’s monitoring system, 
although older and more developed than those of most United Nations 
 
 227. HAAS, supra note 13, at 253. 
 228. Leary, supra note 122, at 598; see also Oliver Liang, Informational Dimensions of the 
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note 13, at 448–49. 
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treaty systems, attracted little interest from the “most dynamic social 
movements, such as human rights and consumer organizations.”233 
4. Theoretical Assessment 
The post-war period provides additional evidence to evaluate 
which theory of IO change best explains the ILO’s evolution.  ILO 
officials responded to the shock of the Second World War by 
successfully pressing for a marked expansion of their pre-war 
mandate.  Although the Office failed in its bid to achieve preeminence 
for the ILO in social and economic affairs, it succeeded in expanding 
the organization’s autonomy and subject matter mandate and in 
locking in those expansions by amending the ILO Constitution. 
This outcome accords with the predictions of some rational 
choice scholars, who assert that IO change is best explained by a 
punctuated equilibrium model in which institutional evolution occurs 
in response to infrequent but intense exogenous forces.234  It even 
more closely tracks the claims of Barnett and Finnemore, who share 
rational choice’s focus on exogenous shocks but who also argue 
(contrary to rational choice scholars) that IO officials capitalize on 
these “moments of rapid global change” to “facilitate their own 
expansion and intervention in the affairs of states and nonstate 
actors.”235  Conversely, these events cast doubt on neofunctionalism’s 
prediction that the most consequential IO change is incremental, 
continuous, and endogenously driven. 
Having successfully managed the post-war transition, however, 
ILO officials faced a different challenge: how to apply existing 
lawmaking and monitoring functions to an expanded policy space, one 
in which their core constituency—workers’ organizations—were no 
longer as independent or as influential in domestic politics.  The 
improvements in lawmaking and monitoring that ILO officials had 
achieved before the war—when the membership was small and 
homogeneous and the ILO was viewed as a paragon for other IOs—
were ill suited to an organization whose members were more 
numerous and diverse and which was forced to compete for 
predominance with other IOs. 
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In this new environment, the ILO Office’s campaign for 
universality, flexibility, and centralization generated inefficient and 
dysfunctional behaviors.  A larger policy domain made it more difficult 
to agree on prioritizing the problems to be regulated, resulting in 
normative incoherence, inconsistent use of flexibility provisions, and 
incentives for states to adopt treaties but not ratify them.  And with 
more members, more treaties, and more diverse standards, centralized 
monitoring of state behavior became increasingly difficult. 
These problematic outcomes resonate with historical 
institutionalist accounts of organizational change that emphasize path 
dependence.  As the use of particular working methods to realize 
specific goals becomes a habit, it is increasingly difficult to change 
either the goals or the methods used to achieve them.  Instead of 
responding to new challenges with fresh approaches, IOs follow 
preexisting rules that channel responses in familiar, time-worn 
directions, ultimately producing dysfunctional outcomes.236  In 
addition, competition with other organizations does not necessarily 
improve performance, a point that historical institutionalist scholars 
also emphasize.237  To the contrary, competition can lead organizations 
to engage in behaviors that are inefficient or undesirable from a 
functional perspective.238 
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE RETURN OF INNOVATION TO THE ILO 
The history of the ILO analyzed in the preceding sections of 
this Article helps to explain why many scholars and commentators 
perceive the ILO to be ineffective and weak.  But this historical study 
also reveals the now-forgotten period of innovation by the first 
generation of ILO officials, who worked independently of states to 
improve the effectiveness of the organization’s lawmaking and 
monitoring functions.  From a theoretical perspective, the ILO’s 
history reveals that both exogenous forces (such as shifting state 
demands and environmental changes) and endogenous forces (such as 
the autonomous interests and working methods of officials and staff) 
are important variables for explaining how IOs change during 
different time periods.  Theories of institutional change that consider 
only one sort of change or another would not have predicted the 
evolution of the world’s oldest extant multilateral organization. 
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This focus on multiple sources of change raises an important 
and unresolved question: can IOs learn from past mistakes?239  Stated 
another way, if the combined effect of exogenous and endogenous 
forces produces inefficient procedures or policy failures, can IOs 
reverse course and correct these errors?  If so, when and how do they 
diverge from path-dependent practices to redefine their goals and 
improve their performance? 
I address these questions in the sections that follow.  I analyze 
the current wave of innovation at the ILO—a period of institutional 
evolution and learning from past errors that began in 1994 following 
nearly half a century of stagnation.  I begin by identifying the 
catalysts for institutional change and then analyze the major reforms 
to ILO lawmaking and monitoring.  I conclude with a discussion of 
how ILO officials are cultivating support from non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) beyond the organization’s core constituency of 
organized labor groups and national trade unions. 
A. The Exogenous Catalysts for Change 
By the mid-1990s, the ILO’s geopolitical and economic 
environment had undergone another major transformation.  The end 
of the Cold War reduced East-West divisions within the ILO, and the 
triumph of market-based economies that followed led both states and 
business interests to emphasize policies that promoted deregulation, 
competition, and free trade.240 
Linked to these developments was a marked decline in the 
influence of organized labor.  As described above, the ILO Constitution 
and the Declaration of Philadelphia adopted a corporatist model of 
social regulation, one in which workers and employers established 
formal associations to negotiate with each other and with 
governments.  For the first half-century after its founding, the ILO’s 
tripartite membership rules mirrored the corporatist structure found 
in most of its member states, in particular in industrialized 
countries.241  During this “heyday of corporatism,” ILO worker and 
employer delegates could “legitimately claim to speak for a substantial 
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portion of the ‘workforce’ or for ‘employers,’ as those terms were then 
understood.”242 
By the early 1990s, however, corporatism was in serious 
decline.  Industrial workplaces structured around unionized, full-time, 
salaried employees with benefits and pensions were no longer the 
norm, even in industrialized democracies.243  Informal, non-unionized, 
part-time, and self-employed workers (an increasing percentage of 
them women) were far more prevalent.  And the eroding divisions 
between home and work and between formerly segmented national 
labor markets were engendering a global workforce that was both less 
organized and more vulnerable.244 
These shifts raised fundamental questions about the ILO’s 
mission and the purpose of the labor standards it produces.  With 
respect to membership, the breakdown of corporatism challenged the 
legitimacy of the ILO’s tripartite structure and the ability of 
“delegates drawn from trade union federations [to] give an effective 
institutional voice to the majority of the [non-unionized] workforce in 
most countries.”245  The post-Cold War emphasis on deregulation and 
competition also created the risk that member states would view 
worker protections as a hindrance to economic development, 
triggering anew the race to the bottom that the ILO’s founders had 
feared.246 
Following in the agenda-setting footsteps of his predecessors, 
Director General Michel Hansenne used the occasion of the ILO’s 
seventy-fifth anniversary in 1994 to emphasize the paradigm-shifting 
nature of these events and the need to reshape the organization’s 
future.  In a report titled Defending Values, Promoting Change: Social 
Justice in a Global Economy,247 the Director General considered how 
to maintain the ILO’s relevance in the face of these “enormous” and 
“unprecedented” challenges.248  In striking contrast to earlier shifts in 
the organization’s environment, however, the Director General did not 
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seek to expand the ILO’s subject matter mandate.  To the contrary, he 
stressed the dangers of “trying to do too much, setting ourselves a 
course of action out of all proportion with the resources and skills at 
our disposal.”249 
In addition to defining the new challenges facing the 
organization, the report candidly admitted that the ILO’s past 
problems were threatening the universality, flexibility, and 
centralization goals that had animated the organization since its 
founding.  It highlighted the declining ratification rate for ILO treaties 
and the “growing discrepancy between the attitude of certain 
governments at the time a [treaty] is adopted . . . and the stance they 
take when the same instrument comes up for ratification.”250  The 
report also indicated that a larger and more diverse membership had 
made the balance between universal and flexible labor standards 
exceptionally difficult to achieve.  And it pointedly stated that the ILO 
had misdirected its past lawmaking efforts, producing a surfeit of 
disjointed conventions and recommendations that were unduly 
stringent or largely irrelevant to the problems of the late 20th century 
workplace.251 
B. Revising the Structure and Function of International Labor 
Standards 
Defending Values, Promoting Change set out a range of 
proposals to address these deficiencies.252  These suggestions set the 
tone for discussions among governments, workers, and employers over 
how to restructure ILO lawmaking and monitoring.  The membership, 
assisted by the ILO Office, quickly adopted a series of major reforms 
that included: (1) a campaign to ratify a core group of labor rights 
treaties; (2) a declaration on fundamental labor rights applicable to all 
member nations; (3) an unprecedented use of the ILO’s sanctioning 
authority; (4) the discarding of outdated labor standards; and (5) 
measures to reduce the pace and improve the quality of ILO 
lawmaking.  I analyze each of these reforms below, emphasizing how 
ILO officials learned both from their past mistakes and from the 
successful practices of other IOs to remedy the perverse incentives, 
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normative incoherence, and inadequate monitoring problems of earlier 
years by narrowing and refocusing the organization’s authority.253 
1. The Ratification Campaign for Fundamental Labor Conventions 
One of the ILO membership’s first tasks was to create a 
hierarchy of international labor standards with a small number of 
conventions at its apex.  Building on the references to human rights in 
the Director General’s report, attention quickly coalesced around eight 
labor rights treaties.  These conventions were labeled as 
“fundamental” to denote their privileged place in the new normative 
order.254  In 1995, the Director General launched an aggressive 
campaign to promote universal ratification of these treaties by all ILO 
members.  In each subsequent year, the Director General has 
published a report on the progress made toward this goal and has 
urged states that have not ratified all of the fundamental conventions 
to do so or to identify specific obstacles to doing so.255 
The ILO Office has judged the ratification campaign to be 
“singularly successful.”256  As of November 2005, the campaign had 
generated 468 new ratifications.  Of the ILO’s 178 member states, 116 
have now ratified all eight fundamental conventions.  All together, the 
Office has received 88% of the total possible ratifications for these 
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eight treaties.257  These statistics reveal that the ratification campaign 
has made substantial progress toward achieving the ILO’s long-held 
objective of universality.  But it has done so by narrowing the 
organization’s focus to a core group of treaties that have the most 
compelling normative claim to adherence by the entire ILO 
membership. 
2. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
The ratification campaign seeks to achieve the ILO’s goal of 
universality by accelerating the traditional international law practice 
of voluntary treaty ratifications.  Yet even as the campaign gathered 
steam in the mid-1990s, ILO officials and workers’ representatives 
recognized the need for a more ambitious approach—a mechanism to 
apply fundamental labor standards to all ILO member states 
regardless of whether they had ratified the treaties protecting those 
standards. 
To achieve this result, the ILO took a page from the book of the 
newly created World Trade Organization (“WTO”).  The agreement 
establishing the WTO was a “single undertaking,” a grand bargain 
that all states were required to accept as a condition of membership.258  
Recognizing the advantages of this global package deal and the threat 
of trade sanctions that held it together, governments, scholars, and 
activists began to debate whether to incorporate new subjects into the 
WTO, including labor rights.259 
The issue came to a head at a 1996 WTO ministerial meeting.  
The trade ministers acknowledged the relationship between free trade 
and labor, but they rejected calls to enforce labor standards with WTO 
sanctions.  Instead, the ministers “propel[led] the issue back into the 
ILO’s court by reasserting . . . the importance of the core rights 
dimension of globalization and the leading role of the ILO in 
managing that issue.”260  This acted as a catalyst for the organization 
to return to first constitutional principles and adopt a new approach—
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the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work.261 
The Declaration is a succinct restatement of the four core labor 
rights—freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, the 
abolition of child labor, and non-discrimination in employment—
protected in the eight fundamental conventions.  It requires member 
states “to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith[,]” the 
“principles concerning the[se] fundamental rights.”262  Significantly, 
these obligations emanate from the ILO Constitution itself, in 
particular the clause that requires states to report on unratified 
conventions.263  The Declaration thus applies to all ILO members 
without regard to the treaties they have adopted or their level of 
economic development.  By anchoring the Declaration in “the very fact 
of membership in the Organization,”264 ILO officials had found an 
ingenious way to mimic the WTO’s single undertaking approach using 
the ILO’s existing constitutional structure. 
In addition to its normative commitments, the Declaration 
creates a new monitoring procedure to review government and private 
sector conduct.  The ILO has given this “follow-up mechanism” a high 
degree of institutional support and funding.265  The mechanism 
features an annual performance review of states which have not yet 
ratified all of the fundamental conventions and an annual “Global 
Report” that addresses one of the rights in depth.  “The aim of each 
Global Report is to provide an overall picture of the trends and 
evolution with respect to the right concerned both in countries which 
have ratified the relevant conventions, and in those which have 
not.”266 
The creation of membership-wide obligations and monitoring 
mechanisms has a partial precursor in the Committee on Freedom of 
Association formed in the 1950s to review workers’ complaints 
alleging violations of trade union rights.267  But the fanfare that 
accompanied the Declaration’s adoption in 1998 suggests something 
considerably more momentous, with many observers heralding the 
recognition of universal principles for all members states as “nothing 
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short of a revolution in legal terms”268 and a “‘constitutional moment’ 
in the life of the ILO.”269 
Whether the Declaration is achieving these lofty goals is a 
subject of lively debate.  Early praise for the Declaration was effusive, 
but more recent assessments are less sanguine.  Participants have 
criticized the follow-up mechanism as “limited by the ILO’s failure to 
develop a politically potent process to debate and prioritize” 
violations,270 and prominent scholars have challenged the 
Declaration’s normative ambiguities, its potential to be co-opted by 
powerful nations for unilateral ends, and its diversion of resources and 
attention from traditional standard setting activities.271  Other 
scholars and former ILO officials have responded with aggressive 
defenses of the Declaration.272  Yet both sides in this debate appear to 
agree that the Declaration’s efficacy will ultimately be judged by its 
real-world effects, and on that score, it must be evaluated together 
with other recent changes in ILO lawmaking and monitoring. 
3. The Threat and Use of Sanctions Against Myanmar 
The goal of both the ratification campaign and the Declaration 
was to create, on paper at least, a common core of legal standards 
applicable to the entire ILO membership.  Promoting compliance with 
these commitments presented a far more difficult task.  The ink on the 
Declaration’s pages was barely dry when the ILO faced its first major 
compliance challenge—stopping the widespread use of forced labor in 
Myanmar. 
The Myanmar situation presented the ILO with a paradigmatic 
case for sanctions.  A 1998 Commission of Inquiry had documented the 
use of forced labor in the country on a widespread scale, in clear and 
flagrant violation of a fundamental labor rights treaty (the 1930 
Forced Labor Convention, which Myanmar had ratified), as well as the 
Declaration’s parallel ban on forced labor.  Confronted with the 
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Commission’s findings, Myanmar’s military government was 
recalcitrant and unrepentant.  Its hostile response ruled out the softer 
managerial approaches and shaming strategies that are the bread and 
butter of ILO monitoring, leaving sanctions as the only remaining 
option.273 
Yet the imposition of sanctions raised delicate and unsettled 
issues.  The Constitution of 1919 expressly authorized “measures of an 
economic character” in response to a state’s failure to implement a 
Commission’s findings.274  But the organization never exercised its 
power to impose trade sanctions, and the 1946 revision of the 
constitution removed this language and substituted a more ambiguous 
mandate for the ILO Conference to take “such action as it may deem 
wise and expedient to secure compliance.”275  In practice, therefore, 
trade sanctions had remained politically and legally out of bounds 
since the ILO’s founding.  The uncertain legality of sanctions under 
the WTO’s free trade rules created an additional deterrent.  Any WTO 
member that imposed trade sanctions in response to a request from 
the ILO might be forced to defend its actions before the WTO dispute 
settlement system and could itself be subjected to trade penalties if 
the sanctions were found to be WTO-incompatible.276 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, to remain idle in the face 
of Myanmar’s open defiance risked landing “a fatal blow” to the ILO 
monitoring system.277  In 2000, the organization responded to this 
threat by adopting a resolution that invoked the constitution’s 
compliance clause for the first time in the ILO’s history.278  The 
resolution asked governments and other IOs to review their relations 
with Myanmar and to assist in implementing the Commission’s 
recommendations.279 
This cautious, incremental approach was hardly surprising 
given the unsettled political and legal terrain that the ILO was 
traversing.  But even this guarded first step produced measurable 
results.  Myanmar officials agreed to site visits from high level 
officials and to a more permanent ILO presence in the country.  They 
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also began to consider specific domestic labor reforms.280  Far more 
significantly, the 2000 compliance resolution facilitated the imposition 
of trade sanctions by ILO member states.  In the United States, for 
example, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003281 
specifically references the ILO resolution as a justification for a 
blanket ban on imports from Myanmar282 until such time as the 
President determines, after consultation with the ILO Director 
General (and other entities), that the military government in 
Myanmar “no longer systematically violates workers rights, including 
the use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers.”283 
Unfortunately, the violation of labor rights in Myanmar 
increased sharply in 2003, and by the end of 2005, the situation had 
reached a critical stage.  Myanmar has threatened to withdraw from 
the ILO (although it has not filed a formal notice of withdrawal), and 
ILO officials are making a final effort to resolve the situation before 
considering whether to impose additional compliance measures, 
including trade sanctions, at the summer 2006 meeting of the ILO 
Conference.284  These events highlight the limited and imperfect tools 
available to pressure rogue states to comply with international law.  
But they also reveal that the ILO membership is now willing to use 
those tools against such states in the pursuit of the organization’s 
fundamental values.285 
4. Pruning International Labor Law 
The ratification campaign and the 1998 Declaration privileged 
a small set of fundamental labor rights and sought to apply them to 
all member states—including global pariahs such as Myanmar.  But 
the ILO also faced the opposite problem: how to weed out and discard 
conventions and recommendations that had become moribund.  
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Although studies of outdated labor standards had been undertaken in 
the past, the organization had taken little concrete action to 
implement their recommendations.  In the changed economic and 
political landscape of the mid-1990s, however, the ILO membership 
gave fresh attention to pruning international labor law’s dead wood.286 
The process proceeded in stages.  First, a new working group 
analyzed and classified all ILO instruments.287  Second, the ILO Office 
began to actively promote the ratification of treaties that the working 
group had identified as up-to-date.  Third, it advocated the removal of 
outdated treaties from the ILO monitoring system.  To achieve this 
result, the Office urged states to denounce outmoded treaties and to 
ratify their corresponding revising conventions.  It also proposed an 
amendment to the constitution288 authorizing the ILO Conference to 
“abrogate” outmoded treaties still in force.289  Pending the 
amendment’s adoption, the Conference would “withdraw” treaties no 
longer in force and “shelve” moribund treaties that were operative in 
name only.290 
Taken together, these efforts have produced a major overhaul 
of international labor standards.  The working group identified 73 up-
to-date conventions and 76 up-to-date recommendations out of 185 
conventions and 195 recommendations—a statistic revealing that 
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useful contribution to attaining the objectives” of the ILO); see also Int’l Lab. Office, Information 
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 290. “Withdrawal” has the same legal effect as abrogation, but is applied to ILO treaties that 
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a treaty dormant and subjects it to only minimal review by the ILO’s monitoring mechanisms. 
Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 14, 15. 
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more than 60% of ILO legal instruments were outdated.291  The ILO 
Conference has since shelved or withdrawn twenty-nine obsolete 
conventions and thirty-six recommendations and identified other 
treaties as candidates for abrogation after the constitutional 
amendment takes effect.292  To speed that result, in 2005 the Office 
launched a campaign to encourage ratification of the amendment.293 
Member states have also increased their unilateral 
denunciation of moribund treaties.  The ILO Office received more than 
250 denunciations between 1996 and the middle of 2005, the large 
majority of which occurred automatically upon the ratification of an 
up-to-date revising convention.294  To further promote these treaties, 
the Office has asked non-ratifying states to describe any impediments 
that prevent or delay their ratification.295 
5. Reducing the Pace and Improving the Quality of Lawmaking 
Since the Director General’s 1994 report, the ILO membership 
has also become more deliberative in its adoption of new treaties.  The 
Office now reviews all suggestions for conventions to determine 
whether the proposed standards are relevant, coherent, and have 
widespread support.296  This more rigorous screening process has 
slowed the pace of lawmaking dramatically.  “In the post-war ‘golden 
era’ the average rate of standard production was 3.15 conventions and 
2.94 recommendations per year.  For the last 10 years this yearly 
average has dropped to 1.1 and 1.3 respectively.”297 
 
 291. Comm. on Legal Issues & Int’l Lab. Standards, Int’l Lab. Office, Improvements in the 
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 292. Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 13; Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress 
Report, supra note 253, at 4. 
 293. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Improvements in Standards, supra note 291, at 2. Eighty member 
states had ratified the amendment seven years after its adoption in 1997. Ratifications from 118 
states are required for the amendment to enter into force. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, 
supra 253, at 4 n.22. 
 294. A search performed using the advanced search web page of ILOLEX, in the category of 
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 295. Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 11. 
 296. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, supra note 253, at 5. 
 297. Langille, Core Labour Rights, supra note 260, at 425 (citing Breen Creighton, The 
Future of Labour Law: Is There A Role for International Labour Standards?, in THE FUTURE OF 
LABOUR LAW 253, 258 (C. Bernard et al. eds., 2004)). 
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As the quantity of treaties has decreased, their quality has 
increased.  The ILO Office now emphasizes the need for consensus 
building before beginning to draft any treaty texts.  These 
deliberations have produced some important successes.  One recently-
adopted treaty—the 1999 Convention on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor—is the most rapidly ratified agreement in ILO history.298 
The Consolidated Maritime Labor Convention (“CMLC”), 
adopted in early 2006, provides an even more striking example.299  The 
CMLC creates an incentive for all actors in the maritime shipping 
industry—flag states, port states, labor-supplying states, ship owners, 
and seafarers—to comply with its provisions.  It achieves this result 
by adapting an integrated certificate and inspection system found in 
widely-ratified maritime treaties adopted by another IO—the 
International Maritime Organization.300  The CMLC also includes a 
flexible blend of hard and soft law and an expedited amendment 
procedure to facilitate changes to the treaty’s technical rules.  Finally, 
and perhaps most remarkably, ship owners and seafarers are both 
strong supporters of the treaty.301  Their joint agreement has made it 
possible for delegates to negotiate the CMLC in less than five years—a 
rapid pace for a mega-treaty that will replace sixty-eight maritime 
labor conventions and recommendations.302 
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 302. See Joint Maritime Commission, Int’l Lab. Office, Final Report, App. 2 
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A final change to ILO lawmaking is a recognition that new 
treaties may not be an optimal way to achieve the organization’s 
regulatory goals.  The “plan of action for migrant workers,” adopted in 
2004, exemplifies this view.303  This plan of action eschews treaty-
making in favor of an “integrated approach” that includes the 
promotion of existing conventions and recommendations, information 
gathering, technical assistance, capacity building, and cooperation 
with other IOs.304  The plan of action thus tackles the contentious 
subject of transborder migration of workers as a whole and with 
greater emphasis on monitoring than was possible under a system of 
sparsely ratified treaties.305 
C. Cultivating Partnerships with NGOs to Address New Workplace 
Realities 
The institutional reforms described in the previous sections go 
a long way toward remedying the problems that plagued lawmaking 
and monitoring during the ILO’s period of institutional stagnation.  
They do not, however, address the declining importance of organized 
labor groups that have long been the ILO’s core constituency.  ILO 
officials have recognized the limitations of the corporatist model to 
address the changing realities of the 21st century workplace.  As a 
result, they have cultivated support from NGOs and advocacy groups 
to extend the ILO’s regulatory reach to workers outside of formal labor 
markets who are not represented by trade unions or industrial 
organizations. 
A 1999 report by the Director General, entitled Decent Work, 
signaled this redefinition of the organization’s mission.306  The report 
reemphasized the ILO’s commitment to core values, including the 
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workers’ rights in the 1998 Declaration and the eight fundamental 
conventions.  But it also marked a clear break with the past.  The 
reference to “work” rather than “labor” was deliberate.  It reflected the 
Director General’s desire for the ILO to regulate all types of work-
related activities, including those not involving employment contracts, 
fixed wages, or unions.  As the report explained: 
Because of its origins, the ILO has paid most attention to the needs of wage workers—
the majority of them men—in formal enterprises.  But this is only part of its mandate, 
and only part of the world of work.  Almost everyone works, but not everyone is 
employed. . . .  The ILO must be concerned with workers beyond the formal labor 
market—with unregulated wage workers, the self-employed, and homeworkers.307 
Reaching these informal workers presented a challenge for the 
organization.  The ILO’s tripartite structure privileges access by 
organized labor and employer associations over other advocacy groups.  
These associations have little incentive to represent the interests of 
other types of workers.308  A key goal of the Decent Work agenda, 
therefore, has been to identify how NGOs “other than trade unions 
and employer associations can make a positive contribution to the 
design and implementation of decent work policies.”309 
As with other recent innovations, ILO officials learned from the 
experiences of other IOs in reaching out to these NGOs.  Following the 
lead of “organizations like the World Bank, the OECD, and the 
European Union,” the officials asked “what so-called ‘civil society’ 
[can] do for decent work policies.”310  The provisional answer appears 
to be that NGOs can make significant contributions to ILO lawmaking 
and monitoring. 
Perhaps the most successful venture illustrating the ILO’s new 
linkages with civil society has been the campaign against child labor 
in Pakistan’s sporting goods industry.  The campaign, launched in 
1996 during a high-profile European soccer championship, dramatized 
the plight of 7,000 children who hand-stitched soccer balls in the 
Sialkot region of Pakistan.311  After the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (an ILO member) publicized the use of child labor 
in the region, all of the relevant parties—the Sialkot Chamber of 
 
 307. Id. Informal work is especially prevalent in developing countries, accounting for nearly 
60% of total employment in Latin America and 90% of new urban jobs in Africa. Id. 
 308. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 371 (stating that ILO worker delegates “do not share the 
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 309. Lucio Baccaro, Civil Society, NGOs, and Decent Work Policies: Sorting Out the Issues 1 
(Decent Work Research Programme Discussion Paper No. DP/127/2001, Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud., 
2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp12701.pdf. 
 310. Id. 
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Commerce and Industry, the ILO, UNICEF, Pakistani NGOs, the 
Government of Pakistan, Save the Children, and the World Federation 
of the Sporting Goods Industry—entered into an agreement to 
eliminate child labor from soccer ball manufacturing in Sialkot.312 
The agreement weaned the industry away from its past 
practices by encouraging the voluntary transfer of production facilities 
from villages and homes to registered stitching centers.  ILO field 
monitors randomly inspected the centers to check for compliance with 
the agreement.  In addition, the agreement funded new education 
centers for children who no longer worked in the soccer industry.313  
According to a 2001 assessment, the Sialkot program has been 
remarkably successful.  Although it has yet to eradicate child labor in 
the region, more than 3,000 children no longer work in the soccer 
industry and 6,400 children are attending over 200 education centers 
set up by the agreement.314 
The ILO is also incorporating NGOs into other facets of its 
lawmaking and monitoring activities.  Its International Program on 
the Elimination of Child Labor is collaborating with international and 
local civil society groups to reduce the number of children working in 
agricultural industries in Africa and in the garment industry in 
Bangladesh.315  NGOs representing workers in the informal economy 
have become more active in lobbying at the ILO, influencing debates 
among workers’ delegates and shaping the substantive policies they 
advanced during a 2002 discussion of “Decent Work and the Informal 
Economy.”316  Finally, in 2004, NGOs seeking greater legal protections 
for migrant workers participated in ILO meetings in Geneva for the 
first time.317  NGOs still lack the mechanisms of institutional voice 
that employer and worker representatives enjoy as members of the 
ILO.318  But their increasing participation reveals the benefits of 
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expanding the corporatist model to include a broader array of civil 
society groups in efforts to promote the fundamental rights of workers. 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE ILO’S RELEVANCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 
The ILO is a creature of the fragile and temporary peace treaty 
that ended World War I.  It is the tangible embodiment of a gesture 
that the victorious Allies made to organized labor groups in 
industrializing democracies to stave off the greater evils of 
communism.  Born into the brief but heady period of interstate 
cooperation which followed that first global military conflict, and 
structured around a corporatist model of social relations that divided 
societies into governments, trade unions and employers’ associations, 
the ILO should not have outlived the demise of the League of Nations.  
It survived through the skillful efforts of the Directors General, the 
ILO Office, and the trade unions that supported them, weathering 
financial and economic crises, another world war, polarizing East-
West conflicts, the struggles of decolonization, and the challenges of a 
globalizing economy. 
Not surprisingly, the ILO’s effectiveness in creating and 
monitoring international labor standards has fluctuated over its 
nearly ninety-year existence.  The organization’s early decades were 
among its most successful.  The hazards of the industrial workplace 
were plain for all to see, and a small and homogeneous membership 
enabled the Directors General and their staffs to expand the ILO’s 
lawmaking and monitoring authority without triggering a backlash 
from states.  The decades following World War II were a different 
matter.  The ILO adopted a capacious mandate for social and economic 
change, extending its reach into uncharted and politically contested 
terrain.  ILO officials continued to follow the lawmaking and 
monitoring procedures of the pre-war years.  But when applied in a 
vastly altered geostrategic environment—one characterized by a 
larger and more diverse membership and national trade unions with 
limited independence and waning political influence—these 
procedures created dysfunctional incentives that impeded the ILO’s 
efficacy. 
In the last decade, however, the organization has shifted 
ground yet again.  ILO officials have ushered in a period of innovation 
and reform, narrowing the organization’s mandate to emphasize a core 
group of fundamental labor rights.  These rights, which bind all states 
by virtue of their membership in the ILO, now serve as the 
organization’s normative polestar.  But they also perform a secondary 
  
2006] GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO 721 
function.  They enable ILO officials to reorient the organization away 
from its past focus on preventing a race to the bottom—a strategic 
framing that views labor protections as detrimental to free trade and 
foreign investment—and to emphasize instead the instrumental 
benefits to all states of adhering to fundamental labor standards.319 
As I explain below, this history of ILO lawmaking and 
monitoring contains insights for international legal scholars and for 
social scientists. 
A. The ILO and Legal Innovation 
For lawyers and legal scholars, this Article rediscovers the 
ILO’s forgotten past and explains how the organization survived and 
prospered when other IOs of the inter-war period failed.  It reveals 
how the first generation of ILO officials cultivated support from 
national labor unions and exploited ambiguities in the ILO 
Constitution to improve the efficacy of the organization’s lawmaking 
and monitoring procedures in aid of the founders’ universality, 
centralization, and flexibility goals. 
The Article also explores the transformations of the ILO’s 
present, in which a blend of treaties, soft law instruments, and 
monitoring mechanisms are carefully vetted, hierarchically organized, 
widely supported, and structured to promote real-world change.  
These legal innovations are the result of ILO officials learning from 
the lawmaking and monitoring experiences of other IOs and from the 
mistakes of the ILO’s own past—most notably an overly ambitious 
social justice agenda that produced a jumble of under-adopted and 
normatively incoherent conventions and recommendations. 
Taken together, this review of ILO lawmaking and monitoring 
belies the conventional wisdom that the ILO is a feeble and ineffectual 
IO whose activities merit little attention from legal scholars or 
policymakers.  As other IOs struggle to make international rules 
relevant to real-world problems and to address increasing demands for 
participation by NGOs and advocacy groups, the ILO’s many years of 
experience in adapting to shifts in its political and economic 
environment and in managing the competing demands of states and 
non-state actors will provide invaluable insight and guidance. 
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B. The ILO and Assessing Theories of Change in International 
Organizations 
For social scientists—and in particular for international 
relations scholars who examine how IOs change—a process-tracing 
case study of the ILO provides an opportunity to assess the three 
theories of institutional change analyzed in this Article.  This 
assessment can best be made by using a counterfactual analysis that 
reviews the hypotheses of rational choice, neofunctionalism, and 
historical institutionalism and then compares those predictions to the 
history of the ILO as it actually unfolded.320 
Rational choice fares poorly under this counterfactual 
analysis.321  Recall that the simplest rational choice models claim that 
state preferences determine the forms and functions of international 
cooperation at any given moment in time.322  Proceeding from this 
premise, rational choice scholars would assert that the ILO’s changes 
throughout its history accurately reflect the shifting preferences of its 
member states.  Yet it is highly unlikely that states would have 
created a multilateral labor standards organization that includes 
workers and employers as full fledged members at any period other 
than immediately following World War I. 
The reasons for this are twofold.  First, the inclusion of 
independent worker and employer associations as equal partners in 
the ILO was a revolutionary break with the state-centric international 
order of the early twentieth century.  This unique tripartite 
membership structure reflected the founders’ endorsement of a 
corporatist model of social relations and their desire to provide 
workers with a meaningful alternative to revolution.  Once these 
social forces subsided, however, there was little reason for states to 
confer IO membership upon non-state actors.  Indeed, it would take 
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another half a century before states would again seriously consider 
allowing civil society groups to participate in IOs, to say nothing of 
granting them equal membership rights.   
A second historical fact casting doubt on the predictions of 
rational choice is the persistence of a freestanding, subject-specific 
labor organization.  As this Article has shown, labor standards are 
closely related to trade and investment, economic development, and 
human rights.  This affinity creates powerful logical and functional 
arguments for linking some or all of these issues together in the same 
IO.  If, for example, states had first regulated international labor 
standards at the end of World War II, they would have almost 
certainly included those standards in the newly-created United 
Nations Economic and Social Council.  (Even with the ILO in 
existence, states invested the Council with a limited mandate to 
address labor rights.)  Similarly, if the ILO had not existed at the end 
of the 20th century, states could logically have paired labor issues with 
free trade, incorporating core labor rights into the WTO’s single 
undertaking.  Or they might have eschewed labor multilateralism 
altogether, leaving powerful countries like the United States to 
include labor standards in their bilateral trade and investment 
agreements with developing countries.   
Many variations are plausible.  The essential point is that the 
allocation of interrelated subjects among different institutions and 
treaties is contingent on politics and history.  If politics and history 
change but the initial allocation of subjects does not, an explanation 
other than rational choice is needed to account for its persistence. 
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that the ILO has 
survived not because it has faithfully reflected state interests or a 
rational distribution of labor-related subjects, but rather that it has 
persisted notwithstanding changes in those interests and subjects.  To 
be sure, this conclusion does not disprove more sophisticated versions 
of rational choice theory, which predict that change in IOs occurs in 
response to infrequent, intense shifts in their external environment 
which lead states to redesign the organization or to shift cooperation 
to a rival IO.  However, a closer examination of the ILO’s history 
refutes these hypotheses as well. 
Major exogenous events such as the Great Depression, World 
War II, the Cold War, and a globalizing economy triggered reactions 
within the organization.  But, contrary to rational choice predictions, 
ILO officials, not member states, were the principal proponents of 
change.  They framed the organization’s responses to these events in 
the form of new treaties, a constitutional amendment, and expanded 
monitoring mechanisms.  Even more striking is the paucity of 
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evidence of states attempting to thwart or undo changes that 
enhanced the authority of ILO officials.323  Far from consciously 
redesigning the ILO to check these new powers, member states largely 
acquiesced in their incremental expansion. 
These unchecked advances in lawmaking and monitoring 
suggest that neofunctionalism more accurately predicts the ILO’s 
evolution and survival.  Yet this theory’s hypotheses, too, ultimately 
come up short.  Neofunctionalism asserts that expansions of IO 
authority result from endogenous and incremental changes sought by 
domestic interest groups, who recognize the benefits of IOs for 
achieving their goals.  Neofunctionalist theory predicts that these 
groups will forge alliances with IO officials and work to enhance the 
authority of those officials.  As support for IOs from domestic interest 
groups grows, cooperation takes on a self-reinforcing character, 
spilling over into areas that are logically and functionally related to 
the organization’s initial mandate.  Ultimately, neofunctionalism 
expects this process to shift loyalties from states to IOs.324 
The history of the ILO does not bear out these claims.  
Alliances between ILO officials and national trade unions were, as 
neofunctionalism predicts, critical to the expansion of lawmaking and 
monitoring activities during the organization’s first two decades.  But 
these linkages weakened rather than strengthened after World War 
II.  With the inclusion of socialist and developing countries, ILO 
officials could no longer count on the support of autonomous trade 
unions in all member states.  Yet international confederations of trade 
unions continued to dominate worker delegations at the ILO.  The 
organization’s links to domestic labor groups atrophied still further 
with the decline of unions in industrial democracies that began in the 
1970s.  These events weakened a crucial source of political support for 
ILO officials, a weakness only recently being redressed by the 
cultivation of contacts with a broader array of labor rights NGOs.  Yet 
these new connections are occurring in an IO that has contracted, not 
expanded, its subject matter mandate, contradicting a key hypothesis 
of neofunctionalism. 
In contrast to rational choice and neofunctionalism, the basic 
premise of historical institutionalism—that history matters—finds 
ample support in this Article’s study of the ILO.  Stated more 
concretely, historical institutionalists claim that the origin and 
 
 323. Notably, the only meaningful rejoinder to the ILO’s overreaching—the withdrawal of 
the United States between 1977 and 1980—was not a response to incremental expansions of ILO 
lawmaking and monitoring, but rather an effort to check the foray by other member states into 
unrelated geopolitical issues. See IMBER, supra note 125, at 64–66. 
 324. See supra Part II.B. 
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evolution of IOs are important predictors of their current functions 
and the constraints they impose on member states.325  This is certainly 
true of the ILO, which still bears the historical imprint of the unique 
social and political forces that animated its birth and shaped its 
constitutional structure. 
Historical institutionalism is less successful at predicting the 
specific sources of change in the ILO.  The organization evolved in 
response to both endogenous and exogenous factors, a combination 
that dovetails with some historical institutionalist accounts.  But 
these accounts are, as I explain below, less adept at specifying a more 
precise causal relationship between these two factors. 
First, the distinct phases of the ILO’s history illustrate 
important variations in the comparative pressure of exogenous and 
endogenous forces during different phases of an IO’s life cycle.  Periods 
of major economic or political instability created opportunities to 
overhaul the organization’s mandate and functions.  Yet the ILO did 
not always capitalize on these critical junctures, with the result that 
more consequential and longer-lasting changes occurred during 
periods of relative quiescence.  As historical institutionalists predict, 
path dependence is an important factor here.326  The effects of early, 
endogenous changes (such as the lawmaking and monitoring 
improvements implemented by ILO officials in the 1920s and 1930s) 
persisted for decades, influencing behavior of the ILO membership 
long after the effects of exogenously-driven changes had dissipated. 
Second, the presence or absence of competitor IOs was a key 
factor in fomenting change within the ILO.  For more than two 
decades after its founding, the ILO was the world’s most successful 
multilateral organization.  In this unfettered environment, ILO 
officials could expand the organization’s lawmaking and monitoring 
powers with little risk that states would shift their support to a 
competing organization.  The creation of the United Nations ended 
this period of institutional hegemony and increased the ILO’s 
insecurity.327  ILO officials reacted by pressing for an expansion of the 
organization’s subject matter mandate—an expansion that its 
preexisting lawmaking and monitoring functions were ultimately ill-
equipped to handle.   
Third, the chronicle of the ILO’s survival suggests that the 
trajectory of IO evolution is not unidirectional, leading inexorably to 
 
 325. See supra Part II.C. 
 326. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 17–53. 
 327. See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 599–600 (identifying “organizational 
insecurity” as one of two explanatory variables that affect how IOs respond to pressures in their 
external environments). 
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expansion (as neofunctionalists claim) or, conversely, to stagnation 
and decline (as some historical institutionalist accounts suggest).  
Moreover, when shifts in direction do occur, they do not follow the 
predictions of any one theoretical paradigm.  For example, the 
expansion of the ILO’s authority did not trigger a backlash from 
states—a claim frequently made by rational choice scholars.  Nor, 
when states reacted, did they efficiently recalibrate design features to 
restore their control over the organization or achieve other functional 
goals.  To the contrary, the incremental competence-enhancing 
changes by ILO officials and staff were difficult to reverse, 
particularly where they resonated with the organization’s 
foundational principles. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ILO has learned 
from other IOs and from its own past the benefits of focusing on core 
values.  Over the last decade, the ILO has adopted a strategy of 
retrenchment, narrowing its mandate to emphasize compliance with a 
limited group of fundamental labor rights.  This strategy casts doubt 
on accounts of institutions that emphasize their inherently 
expansionist tendencies.  It also belies the recent claim that “IOs 
appear to be steadily expanding their mandates in a convergent 
direction” by becoming “increasingly involved in the domestic affairs of 
states.”328 
The rich history of the ILO explored in this Article poses new 
theoretical challenges for scholars who study how and why 
international organizations change.  These challenges include 
determining the factors that define the “strategic space” within which 
IO officials and staff can act autonomously;329 identifying when 
putative reforms produce more effective institutions as opposed to 
creating the appearance of efficiency without producing tangible 
results; and specifying the conditions under which IO officials choose 
to constrict their authority rather than expand it. 
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